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Abstract
The first essay (Chapter 2) highlights the positive e↵ect of banks on direct financing
in a setting where each agent believes that she can evaluate information better than
any other agent. Banks emerge endogenously and they encourage direct financing
through the use of underwriting and liquidity (reserve) requirements. Banks sell
underwriting contracts to investors who wish to invest directly. Bank reserves reas-
sures direct investors that the underwriting contract will be fulfilled. This results in
the financing of positive NPV projects that were previously denied credit.
In the second essay (Chapter 3) an entrepreneur has the choice to access either
monitored bank financing or un-monitored bond financing. Project type is private
information of the entrepreneur and as a consequence, in the unregulated equilib-
rium, there is some ine cient over-monitoring by banks when the banking sector
is competitive. Bank lending becomes more e cient and the net interest margin
falls as bond financing becomes cheaper and the bond market expands. In contrast,
if the banking sector is monopolistic, the equilibrium is either e cient or there is
ine cient under-monitoring by banks.
The final essay (Chapter 4) proposes a model of optimal bank capital structure.
There are two types of potential investors with di↵erent monitoring skills. The
skilled can monitor a project and increase its productivity, whereas the unskilled
cannot. Also, the skilled can divert a part of the project’s return without being
detected by the unskilled. Banks emerge endogenously and bank capital structure is
relevant. The skilled become the bank’s equity-holders whereas the unskilled become
depositors. Our model explains why bank equity is more expensive than deposits.
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Chapter 1
Overview
1
The thesis consists of three theoretical essays on the economics of banking and fi-
nancial structure. Chapters Two and Three examine the choice of external financing
source. Does the structure of the financial system - the mix of banks and financial
markets - a↵ect the real sector? While Chapter Four focuses on bank financing
and explores security design issues. Across the thesis, the emphasis is to validate
predictions using existing empirical results and generating new testable hypothesis.
The financial system comprises banks (more generally, financial intermediaries)
and capital markets. The primary tasks of the financial system are related to resource
allocation and risk-sharing. There is a large literature on the risk sharing aspect of
the financial system (For example, Diamond and Dybvig, 1983, Allen and Gale,
1997).
In this thesis, I look at the role of the financial system in allocation of resources.
Essentially, both banks and financial markets perform the same task which is trans-
fer funds from one set of individuals (savers) to another (entrepreneurs with project
ideas). Of course, the two mechanisms are distinct. While in bank financing, the in-
vestment decision is delegated to the bank manager, in financial markets the holders
of funds make the decisions independently and invest directly.
One of the central issues in Chapters 2 and 3 is whether structure of the financial
system (also known as the financial system architecture) matters for real growth.
Does it matter whether an economy is market-based or bank-based? There is em-
pirical evidence that not only the size, but also the structure of the financial system
matters for economic growth (Tadesse, 2002). Further, Levine and Zervos (1998)
find that both stock markets and banks positively a↵ect economic growth.
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At one end of the spectrum, the financial markets dominate the banking sector in
countries like the US. At the other end, it is the banking sector which is dominant in
countries like Japan and Germany. Is one system necessarily better than the other?
The second issue is whether there is a feedback channel between banks and finan-
cial markets. In most existing papers, banks and markets compete (For example,
Allen and Gale (1997, 1999), Deidda and Fattouh (2008)). However, Demirguc-Kunt
and Maksimovic (1996) and Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2000) find cross-country
empirical evidence that at least at the lower levels of financial development of an
economy, banks and markets play a complementary role. In terms of theoretical
work, Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and Song and Thakor (2010) provide models
of complementarity between banks and markets. In Holmstrom and Tirole (1997),
the direction of feedback is one-way; bank financing allows firms to tap the capital
market. In contrast, Song and Thakor (2010) provide a model in which the direction
of feedback goes both ways.
Chapter 4 addresses a di↵erent question. It deals with security design issues in
banking. Is bank equity more expensive than deposits (after risk adjustment)? In
Chapters 2 and 3, the bank capital structure is irrelevant. Specifically, the bank may
raise its funds from depositors or an equity base; no distinction is made between the
two sources of funds. A standard assumption in banking literature is that bank
equity is more expensive than deposits after risk adjustment. Recent examples
include Allen, Carletti and Marquez (2011) and Mehran and Thakor (2011). The
aim of Chapter 4 is to develop a framework in which bank equity capital is more
expensive than deposits.
I discuss optimal intervention by a regulator whenever there is a market failure
3
and an intervention may improve the net social welfare. In terms of government
intervention, I take the stance that a regulator wishes to maximize the net social
surplus. Other types of ine ciencies arise in the models (e.g. cross subsidization
across types). However, the regulator does not care about the distributional ine -
ciencies. The sole objective of the regulator is to maximize the net social surplus.
Methodologically, the thesis uses simple game-theoretic models to study the role of
banks. I use static games of external financing choice of firms to explore subtle and
complex trade-o↵s and tease out important implications. The model in each of the
three chapters has a distinct set of features and these are described below. However,
there is a common thread which is present in all the three models in the thesis. The
management of the bank is delegated to a manager who incurs a cost on behalf of the
bank in order to resolve informational issues. The idea of delegation of monitoring
has been around since Diamond (1984). As is well known, delegation is desirable on
several accounts. In Chapters 2 and 3 it saves duplication of (learning or monitoring)
costs and the free rider problem. In addition to cost-saving, in Chapter 4, the banker
is more skilled or able to manage projects and increases the productivity of funds.
Below, I outline the key features in the models and describe some results:
In Chapter Two (which is a coauthored project with Dr. Kostas Koufopoulos),
delegation is costly because the uninformed bank members do not trust that the
informed manager has accurately interpreted the data. Learning in the model is
perfect, in the sense that if agents incur the learning cost they observe the future state
with certainty and all informed individuals agree with one another. However, there is
a behavioral assumption that uninformed individuals discount the decision-making
skills of informed individuals. As a consequence, there may arise a state in which the
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informed banker observes the high state but fails to raise the necessary investment
funds from the coalition members (who are uniformed). In such circumstances, the
banker may sell underwriting (or insurance) contracts to capital market investors,
as long as the banker can credibly promise that if the low state does occur, he will
be able to fulfill the underwriting contract. Regulatory liquidity requirements make
the underwriting contract credible and thereby, facilitate direct financing.
Our key contributions are as follows: banks emerge endogenously and they en-
courage direct financing through the use of underwriting and liquidity (reserve)
requirements. This results in the financing of positive NPV projects that were pre-
viously denied credit. In addition, the paper provides a new rationale for liquidity
requirements. The role of liquidity requirement in banking as a macro-prudential
instrument is well understood (see Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). Our justification for
the imposition of liquidity requirements comes from the asset side of the bank’s bal-
ance sheet. We also highlight that there is a cost to imposing liquidity requirements
as it makes the bank formation constraint tighter.
In Chapter Three, an entrepreneur may access either monitored bank financing or
un-monitored bond market financing to raise funds for her project. While investors
in the bond market only provide credit, a banker monitors a project in addition to
provision of credit. Monitoring is costly but increases the probability with which a
project succeeds. The key extension to the standard framework is that projects are
heterogeneous; di↵erent projects experience di↵erent increase in success probability
as a result of monitoring. It is e cient to monitor a project only if the net benefit
from monitoring is positive. Project type is private information, which results in
some ine ciencies in credit allocation.
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In the unregulated competitive equilibrium, the banking sector is too large and
there is over-monitoring. This ine ciency arises because some intermediate type
projects (for which monitoring is socially wasteful) are subsidized in bank lending
by higher type projects. I show that if bank equity is more expensive than deposits,
a regulator may impose capital requirements (or tax the bank in another way) such
that the first best outcome is achieved. On the other hand, if the banking sector
is monopolistic, the equilibrium is either e cient (first best) or the banking sector
is too small and there is under-monitoring. The key contribution here is that I
relate lending e ciency to the net interest margin. I show that, irrespective of the
structure of the banking sector, a wider net interest margin indicates higher degree
of ine ciency in lending.
In Chapter Four (which is a co-authored project with Dr. Kostas Koufopoulos)
we have two types of financiers with di↵erent monitoring skills. The skilled can
monitor the project and increase its productivity, while the unskilled cannot. As a
consequence, the skilled investors have a higher outside option than the unskilled,
where the outside option is defined as the payo↵ an investor earns when investing
on his own. Bank emerges as monitoring is delegated to a skilled investor due to
economies of scale in monitoring. The key friction in the model is that a skilled
banker may divert part of the profits from the unskilled bank members. The diver-
sion is unverifiable in the court of law and may not be contracted upon.
In this risk-neutral setting bank capital structure is relevant and bank equity
is more expensive than deposits. The first result is that the equity and deposit
markets are segmented. While the skilled investors hold equity claim in the bank,
the unskilled investors hold the senior deposit claim. If diversion is su ciently large,
6
an unskilled investor does not participate in the bank as an equity holder due to
violation of his participation constraint. The senior debt claim gives the unskilled
investors priority over the verifiable fraction of the cash-flow and convinces them
to deposit in the bank. The expected return on equity is higher than the expected
return on deposits. The higher return is not related to risk and arises due to scarcity
of skill combined with a higher outside option of the skilled investors.
7
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Chapter 2
The Beneficial E↵ect of Banks on
Direct Financing
10
2.1 Introduction
The structure of the financial system is concerned with the channels through which
funds are transferred from savers to entrepreneurs with investment opportunities.
Some of the most pressing issues in this field relate to the determinants of the
structure of the financial system - whether it is bank-based or market-based - and of
course, the impact that this structure has on the real sector. There is evidence that
not only the size, but also the structure of the financial system matters for economic
growth (Tadesse, 2002). Further, Levine and Zervos (1998) find that both stock
markets and banks positively a↵ect economic growth. Therefore it is important to
understand how the structure of the financial system mobilizes savings and channels
them to positive NPV projects which, in turn, leads to higher economic growth.
In most existing papers, banks and markets compete.1 In contrast, in our model
banks have a positive e↵ect on direct financing (markets). We identify two elements
which are crucial for this positive e↵ect: i) Underwriting or Insurance2 and ii) Bank
Liquidity or Reserve Requirements3. Banks encourage direct financing by selling
underwriting contracts to investors who wish to invest directly. Bank reserves are
set aside and not used for investment in projects. Instead they are used as a bu↵er
stock to reassure agents who wish to invest directly that the underwriting contract
will be fulfilled. We show that projects that were previously denied credit by either
banks or directly, may receive funds with the help of underwriting and regulatory
bank reserves. That is, this paper provides a new rationale for reserve/liquidity
requirements. Our justification is based on the asset side of the bank’s balance
1See for example, Allen and Gale (1997), (1999), Boot and Thakor (1997a), Deidda and Fattouh
(2008)
2We use these terms interchangeably for the remainder of this text
3We use these terms interchangeably for the remainder of this text
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sheet. This is in contrast to the existing literature where the arguments for reserve
requirements come from the liability side.
More specifically, we consider a model where agents can pay a cost to learn the
state of nature. If they observe the high state, they will invest in the project, whereas
if they learn that the state of nature is low they will not invest. The formation of
a coalition (bank) saves duplication of this learning cost as learning is delegated to
a manager. Also agents underestimate the value of information when it is filtered
through actions (underestimate the decision-making skills) of others. In any other
respect, agents are rational and they maximize their utility given their perception
of others’ decision-making skills. If agents trust the decision-making skills of others
su ciently, they will coalesce to form a bank and delegate learning to a manager (a
randomly picked individual with identical beliefs as the others in the population).
Otherwise, each agent will incur the learning cost independently and subsequently
decide whether or not to invest. Relative to direct financing, the trade-o↵ for banks
is lower learning cost (advantage) versus the possibility of disagreement about the
project outcome (disadvantage).
Consider the case that prior to learning, it is optimal to form a bank. Ex-post
however, coalition members may not su ciently trust the manager and refuse to
provide the required funds even if the manager has learnt that the state of nature
is high. That is, because of the disagreement between the bank manager and the
bank members, a project with positive net present value (NPV) does not receive
financing although there are funds available. In this scenario, the manager can
provide underwriting to investors who wish to invest directly. This insures these
investors against the realization of the low outcome and incentivizes them to invest
12
in projects that they would not otherwise.
What allows the bank manager to credibly o↵er underwriting is the regulatory
bank reserves. In the absence of the bank reserves, the investors would not buy the
insurance contract, as according to their perception it could not be fulfilled. Thus,
the use of underwriting backed by the bank reserves implies that more positive NPV
projects receive direct financing. This leads to a larger financial system and higher
economic growth (because more positive NPV projects receive financing). This is
consistent with existing empirical evidence (e.g. Levine, 2001). However, despite
their usefulness, bank reserves are not provided voluntarily by the bank members
and they should be imposed by regulation.
Imposing liquidity requirements on a bank is not without a cost. We show that
higher liquidity requirements make the bank formation constraint tighter and so,
there is an upper bound to liquidity requirements consistent with bank formation.
With a perfect learning technology the banks reserves are never used; it is simply
there to make the banker’s promise credible. However, we show that when the
learning technology is noisy, bank reserves are used on the equilibrium path to cover
unexpected losses (see Section 4.2).
The key to our results is the assumption that individuals undervalue the informa-
tion of others. This assumption may not be consistent with rational expectations
and so it requires some justification. Numerous experimental studies, both by psy-
chologists and economists, indicate that the majority of people overestimate their
abilities and the outcomes of their actions.
In one of the earliest studies, Svenson (1981) finds that 93% of the automobile
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drivers in Sweden consider themselves ’above average’. Camerer and Lovallo (1999)
show in an entry game that subjects overestimate their relative ability to solve
puzzles. Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008) provide evidence that CEOs are over-
confident about their abilities to manage a company. These and related studies are
summarized in DellaVigna (2009).
Moreover, Weizsacker (2003) finds that agents significantly underestimate the ra-
tionality of others. In e↵ect, people tend to be overly skeptical of the decision-making
skills of others. Also, Weizsacker (2010) finds that in situations where it is optimal
to follow others and contradict one’s own information, the players still err in the
majority of cases, forgoing substantial parts of earnings (rejecting rational expecta-
tions). Importantly, Andreoni and Mylovanov (2012) find that disagreements may
persist over time even when su cient information to reach agreement is provided.
This occurs because agents put more weight on the information that they receive
directly, rather than indirectly through actions of others.4
In our setting, all agents who incur the learning cost reach the same conclusions
and never disagree with one another. However, agents are skeptical about the con-
clusions of others (from learning) and believe that they may have drawn di↵erent
(more accurate) conclusions, from identical information if they were to observe the
information themselves. We further assume (in line with Allen and Gale, 1999), that
the degree of skepticism is project-specific. The clarity of the data will determine
the level of skepticism about the decision-making skills of others. An innovative
project with complex and scarce data will be more di cult to value and individuals
will trust less the decision-making skills of others regarding this project.
4Santos-Pinto and Sobel (2005) provide a theoretical explanation to this behavior.
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Regarding empirical implications, our model predicts that projects characterized
by a lot of uncertainty (and hence disagreement) will be directly financed while those
with low uncertainty are financed by banks. We share this prediction with Allen and
Gale (1999). Further, our model predicts that a decrease in the degree of uncertainty
about the prospects of projects leads to a higher level of bank liquidity requirements
consistent with bank formation.
2.2 Related Literature
Our paper is related to three strands in the literature. i) The literature on reserve
requirements, ii) The literature on financial intermediation and iii) The literature
on the interaction between banks and capital markets.
i) Central banks explicitly state that they impose reserve requirements to foster
financial stability and to deal with volatile capital flows (Glocker and Towbin, 2012).
Calomiris (2011) argues that it is important to think of reserve requirements as
more than simply an instrument to limit illiquidity risk. Calomiris, Heider and
Hoerova (2012) propose a model in which liquidity requirements are used as a macro-
prudential instrument. In the interbank market, banks commit to lending each
other funds to insure against bank-specific liquidity needs. Liquidity requirements
are imposed to prevent free-riding on the e cient interbank liquidity assistance.
Additionally, higher cash reserves are imposed to mitigate risk-shifting incentives.
Moreno (2011) and Gray (2011) describe the use of reserve requirements as a macro
prudential tool. In contrast, our arguments for liquidity requirements stem from the
asset side of the bank’s balance sheet. Liquidity requirements allows the bank to
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credibly sell underwriting contracts (expand its assets) which result in the financing
of positive NPV projects, which are otherwise denied credit.
ii) There is a large literature on the existence of financial intermediaries. The exis-
tence of financial intermediaries is usually attributed to their informational advan-
tages; they facilitate pre-contract information production and post-contract mon-
itoring in a way that lenders avoid duplication costs and entrepreneurs exert the
desired e↵ort level. Another strand of the literature provides liquidity provision sto-
ries for the existence of financial intermediaries.5 The papers more closely related
to ours are the following:
Our intermediary is similar in spirit to the one in Diamond (1984). The interme-
diary in our model avoids duplication of the learning cost (pre-lending as opposed
to post-lending moral hazard resolution in Diamond, 1984) by delegating the task
to a manager. However, there is also a cost to intermediated finance which arises
due to agents’ skepticism over the decision-making skills of others. The trade-o↵
determines which form of financing is more e cient.
Allen (1993) notes that banks and markets perform two unique and separate roles
in the economy, thereby emphasizing the importance of each. What distinguishes
banks and markets is the structure of institutions as opposed to the instruments they
use. Banks individually negotiate contracts while in capital markets there are large
numbers of anonymous lenders who take the pre-specified contracts. Markets allo-
cate resources e ciently - provided pricing is accurate - because they continuously
check whether the manager is working sensibly and that he or she has information
5See for example, Leland and Pyle (1977), Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Diamond (1984), Ramakr-
ishnan and Thakor (1984), Boyd and Prescott (1986), Allen (1990), Gorton and Penacchi (1990),
Allen and Gale (1997), and Diamond and Rajan (2000,2001) among others
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close to the true information set or at least the market’s perception of the true infor-
mation set. If a manager is far o↵ from the market’s beliefs, prices will reflect that as
a lot of di↵erent views - those of the market participants - will come together as op-
posed to a single bank doing the monitoring. In that sense, capital markets provide
a way of checking whether firms are well-run when there are diverse opinions on the
project’s prospects. When there is no consensus on how firms should be run, banks
may not be as e↵ective as there is a single check which is performed by the bank’s
manager. Hence banks are a good way to provide financing in traditional industries
where technology is well known and there is a wide consensus on how firms should
be run. In this case, the bank can monitor firms e↵ectively and take advantage of
scale economies in monitoring. Financing through capital markets is thus desirable
in industries where there is a high degree of technological innovation. This idea is
formalized in Allen and Gale (1999) which forms the basis of our model. Our paper
di↵ers from Allen and Gale (1999) in three key aspects: First, our interpretation of
the disagreement among agents is di↵erent.6 Second, in Allen and Gale (1999) the
agents know the exact value of   (degree of agreement) before they decide whether
they invest on their own or coalesce to form a bank. In contrast, in the generalized
version of our model (section 3), when the agents make this decision they know the
distribution of   but not the exact value. They observe the exact value of   only
after becoming a bank member. Third, Allen and Gale (1999) do not consider bank
reserves and underwriting and so, in their model there is no interaction between
banks and markets.
iii) Boot and Thakor (1997a,b) provide the first formal model that endogenizes the
co-existence of banks and markets by highlighting the uniqueness of each. Borrowers
6See the discussion in the introduction (page 5) and in the model.
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with lower observable quality prefer bank financing as banks mitigate the post-
lending asset substitution problem and these borrowers do not su↵er a loss with
banks. Borrowers who pose milder moral hazard risk will go directly to capital
markets as informed investors are reasonably sure that these borrowers will invest in
good projects and make use of their information (which is conveyed through prices).
In these models, banks and markets compete which is in contrast with our paper, in
which banks and markets positively interact.
Song and Thakor (2010) develop a model in which banks and markets comple-
ment each other and co-evolve. Through the securitization channel, banks increase
participation in capital markets. As participation in the capital market increases,
the bank’s cost of raising equity capital falls which leads to an expansion of bank
lending. In our case, banks expand direct financing through underwriting contracts
which are backed by the regulatory bank reserves.
2.3 The Model
2.3.1 The Economic environment
Our model is very similar to Allen and Gale (1999). More specifically, we consider
a three-date economy (t = 0, 1, 2) with universal risk neutrality and a zero riskless
interest rate. There are two types of agents: entrepreneurs and investors; all agents
consume at t = 2. The entrepreneur has access to a project that needs investment,
I at t = 1 and returns are realized at t = 2. The project yields H in the good state
and L in the poor state (H > I > L). The probability of each state is specific to
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each project and not a function of the overall economy. The entrepreneur has zero
endowment and seeks the required funds, I, for investing in the project at t = 1.
There are X investors who are symmetric in beliefs regarding the profitability of the
project, to start with. Each of these investors has an endowment of (I + 2c + K)
at t = 0. At date t = 0, the investor has the choice to incur a fixed cost c > 0,
to obtain further information prior to deciding whether or not to invest. A project
has constant returns to scale and its scale is capped. The maximum investment in
one project is Y I. We assume that the sum of the endowments of all investors is
less than the amount demanded by entrepreneurs. This assumption implies that the
financiers (individual investor or the bank) have all the bargaining power and so the
full surplus (the NPV of the project) accrues to the financiers.
There are also some other agents that have zero endowment and the bank manager
will be chosen among these agents.7 Managerial compensation is a positive function
of the ex-post bank profit and is paid at t = 2. Compensation is an infinitesimally
small proportion of the realized returns (manager’s outside option is normalized to
0) and we generally ignore it in our analysis as we do not have any implications
for/from it.
By incurring the fixed cost of learning, c at t = 0 any individual will learn the state
of nature prior to deciding whether or not to invest, I at t = 1. If she observes the
high state of nature, the project returns H at t = 2, otherwise the project returns
L. Learning is therefore perfect in this model. The ex-ante probability of the high
state is given by ↵.
7Alternatively, the bank manager could have been randomly chosen among the bank members. The
only di↵erence is that in case of disagreement, the bank manager could invest his own funds, I.
Assuming that the maximum scale of the project, Y I, is su ciently larger than I, investment I is
negligible. However, our current formulation simplifies the algebra.
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To make the analysis interesting, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1: ↵H + (1  ↵)L  I < 0 i.e. it is never optimal to invest uncondi-
tionally.
This assumption implies that no project will receive any funding, unless either
individual investors or a bank incurs the cost of learning the state of nature.
If all agents incur the learning cost, c, they will all draw the same conclusion
regarding the outcome of the project. However, agents discount information when
it is filtered through the actions of others. An uninformed agent believes that the
conclusion reached by another individual is correct with probability   2 [↵, 1) and
wrong with the complementary probability. These beliefs are common knowledge
among all agents in the economy. Furthermore, we assume that the parameter,   is
project specific. An innovative project with complex and scarce data will be more
di cult to value and individuals will trust less the decision-making skills of others
regarding this project (lower  ). If   = ↵, the agents do not learn anything from the
actions of others and do not update their unconditional probability despite observ-
ing the actions of others who have analyzed the data. Any project is characterized
by the two parameters, (↵,  ). Although our model is similar to Allen and Gale
(1999), there are two critical di↵erences with respect to the parameter  . First, our
interpretation of   is di↵erent. More specifically, Allen and Gale define it as the
measure of correlation among informed investors’ beliefs. That is, in their inter-
pretation, if two agents incur the cost and learn the state of nature, they may still
disagree with probability, (1   ), whereas in our interpretation they fully agree. In
our case, the disagreement arises only among an informed and an uninformed agent.
Second, in the generalized version of our model (section 3.3), when the agents decide
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whether to invest on their own or coalesce to form a bank, they do not know the
exact value of  , as in Allen and Gale (1999). They only know the distribution of
 . They observe the exact value of   at t = 1. The idea behind this more general
formulation is that between bank formation and the actual investment in the project
some more information arrives which helps the uninformed bank members obtain a
better estimate of their degree of disagreement with the bank manager. Allen and
Gale (1999) implicitly assume that no new relevant information becomes available
to bank members after bank formation.
2.3.2 Basic model
For expositional purposes we start with the benchmark case where the exact value
of the project   is known at t = 0, there are no liquidity requirements and no
underwriting.
Direct Financing
Direct financing occurs when investors incur the cost of learning the state of nature
and then decide individually whether or not to fund the project. BecauseH > I > L,
an individual invests only if she observes the high state in which the project returns
H. The expected payo↵ at t = 0 to an informed individual investor if she invests
directly is,
VD = ↵(H   I)  c (2.1)
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If an investor decides to invest c at t = 0, at t = 1 she learns the state of nature.
Therefore at t = 0, an individual investor incurs the learning cost only if,
VD = ↵(H   I)  c > 0
Bank Financing
Intermediated financing is the case when N investors will coalesce to share the
learning cost, c; each member of the coalition will contribute cN towards the learning
cost at t = 0 and if at t = 1 perceives it as a profitable investment, she will provide I
units of investment funds. An investor has the right to participate in the investment
of the project through the bank only if he pays his share of the learning cost at t = 0.
Information gathering is delegated to a manager who is randomly selected from the
population. The manager will become informed and truthfully reveal his findings
to the members at t = 1, who then decide whether to provide the investment funds
or not. The coalition members do not learn the state of nature themselves - the
manager can only reveal to them his own opinion about the prospects of the project.
With probability  , the coalition members believe that the manager has assessed
the project accurately and with probability (1    ) coalition members believe that
manager has made a mistake. If the manager observes the high state, the expected
return of the investment for an uninformed investor is  H + (1   )L.
Hence, the expected payo↵ at t = 0, to a bank member is,
VB = ↵( H + (1   )L  I)  c
N
(2.2)
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At t = 0, coalition formation is feasible as long as the expected return is weakly
positive. So, each member will provide her share of the learning cost, cN only if,
VB = ↵( H + (1   )L  I)  c
N
> 0
If this condition is satisfied and the manager observes the high state after learning,
all coalition members provide the investment amount, I, at t = 1 because the above
condition (VB > 0) implies that,
 H + (1   )L  I > 0
The learning cost is treated as sunk at t = 1. Note that if the opinion of others
is not undervalued i.e. (  = 1), intermediated finance strictly dominates direct fi-
nancing, as duplication of learning costs is costlessly avoided (the bank disadvantage
disappears).
Direct vs Bank Financing
At t = 0 individual investors decide whether they will incur the learning cost, c,
and invest on their own or not invest at all or they will coalesce with other investors
and share the learning cost. If some agents decide to coalesce but the expected
payo↵ of each member is lower than what she can achieve on her own (because the
number of agents is not su ciently high) then the coalition is dissolved and each
individual acts on her own. We look for symmetric pure strategy Nash Equilibria
in this game. The agents choose their strategies to maximize their expected payo↵s
and this determines the form of financing.
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Depending on parameter values, there are four cases to be considered:
Case 1: VB < 0 and VD < 0 for any N  Y .
Case 2: VD > 0 and VD > VB for any N  Y .
Case 3: VB > VD > 0 for some N  Y .
Case 4: VB > 0 > VD for some N  Y .
In cases 1 and 2 the outcome is clear as it is a strictly dominant strategy for all
agents. In case 1, the unique equilibrium involves no financing. In case 2, there is a
unique equilibrium where only direct financing exists.
In cases 3 and 4 the outcome is described in the following proposition:
Proposition 1: Let VB > 0 > VD or VB > VD > 0 for some N  Y . Then the
e cient outcome (bank financing) arises as a unique Nash equilibrium. Only one
bank finances each project (The bank size, NI, equals the size of the project Y I) and
each individual member incurs a learning cost of cy .
Proof. Given that VB > 0 > VD or VB > VD > 0 for some N  Y , the expected
payo↵ for an individual from joining a coalition is pVB +(1  p)VD > VD or pVB > 0
for any 0 < p  1, where p is the probability that the investment takes place
through the coalition (bank). So, for any agent, it is a strictly dominant strategy
to join some other agent(s) and form a coalition. We now show that there cannot
exist an equilibrium in which the bank size (NI) is less than the scale of the project
(Y I). Consider the case where there are two banks of equal size (Y I2 ). In this case,
a member of either bank can increase her profit by joining the other bank because
now she shares the cost, c, with more members. By a similar argument, we can rule
out any bank size but, Y I. Suppose now that there is one bank with size NI = Y I.
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Then the deviation of any member of this bank to either market financing or no
financing would imply a lower profit for her (given the conditions in cases 3 and 4).
Therefore, the equilibrium with bank financing with one bank is unique.
2.3.3 A more general model
In this section we extend the basic model in two dimensions:
i) The project’s   is not known with certainty at t = 0. We assume that   is
uniformly distributed in the interval [ ,  ] and this is public knowledge at t = 0.
The exact value of   is observed at t = 1.
ii) The manager may undertake o↵-balance sheet activities such as underwriting
The payo↵ of direct financing is exactly the same as in the previous section. For
simplicity , we consider the case that the expected payo↵ to direct financing is
negative (VD < 0). This implies that direct financing is infeasible and so the outside
option of an investor is who does not join a bank is 0. We consider bank financing
for the following two cases:
i) There are no liquidity requirements and
ii) Regulators impose a liquidity requirement (defined later)
Direct Financing
The payo↵ of direct financing in the market is as before. The expected payo↵ to an
informed individual investor in the market is,
VD = ↵(H   I)  c
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We assume that VD < 0. That is, direct financing in infeasible. In what follows,
we show that the existence of banks can prompt direct financing in an environment
where the latter does not otherwise occur (although it is e cient).
Bank Financing with No liquidity requirements:
First, we consider the case in which there are no regulatory liquidity requirements.
At t = 0, it is commonly known that the project’s   is uniformly distributed in
[ ,  ], and the bank members observe the exact value of   at t = 1 (denote as  R).
Definition: There is a threshold,  ⇤, where   <  ⇤ <  , for which the net payo↵
to providing investment funds to the manager at t = 1 is 0 (after treating learning
costs as sunk) and is given by,
 ⇤H + (1   ⇤)L  I = 0)  ⇤ = I   L
H   L (2.3)
At t = 0, the bank members provide the learning cost only if,
VB = ↵

 ⇤ +  
2
H +
✓
1   
⇤ +  
2
◆
L  I
 
  c
N
> 0 (2.4)
Consider the case that the manager observes the high state. If  R >  ⇤, the coalition
members provide the required funds, I at t = 1 since,
 RH + (1   R)L  I > 0
If, however,  R <  ⇤, the coalition members do not provide the required funds at
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t = 1 since,
 RH + (1   R)L  I < 0 (2.5)
Thus, at t = 1, if  R <  ⇤, the manager cannot invest in the project, despite
observing the high state. The manager wishes to maximize the ex-post profit for the
bank to maximize his own compensation. To that end, given that he observes the
outcome as high with certainty, he attempts to sell underwriting contracts to the
direct investors.
Direct investors have the same information as the bank members; i.e. they observe
 R. If we assume that the direct investors do not observe  R, our arguments still
go through. As we describe below, the key to our argument is that direct investors
have a su ciently low   (i.e.   <  ⇤). Even if they did not observe the exact
realization of  , direct investors observe that the bank members do not provide the
investment funds and rationally infer that  R <  ⇤. Their best conditional estimate
of the project   is
 + ⇤
2 <  
⇤.
Definition: An underwriting contract is a commitment at t = 1 of the bank to the
direct investor that in the event that the low state, L occurs at t = 2, the bank will
transfer some funds to the investor, such that the return to the investor in the low
state is L0 > L. To buy this contract, the investor pays a fee, Z, to the bank at
t = 1. The expected payo↵ of the individual investor in the market from a project
financed through underwriting is denoted VC ,
VC =  RH + (1   R)L0   I   Z (2.6)
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Assuming that the bank has all the bargaining power, the net payo↵ to the market
investors will be 0 (VC = 0). This implies that the fee is given by,
Z =  RH + (1   R)L0   I (2.7)
In order to maximize the bank profit (and his compensation), the bank manager will
maximize Z given L0  H. 8
Lemma 1: The underwriting contract sets L0 = H and so the fee, Z = H   I.
Proof. See Appendix.
Market investors will accept the underwriting contract only if the bank manager
has access to some funds, which will reassure them that the manager will fulfil his
promise. However, given  R <  ⇤ the bank members will not voluntarily provide
any funds more than c at t = 0 and no market investor will buy the underwriting
contract. Formally,
Lemma 2: At t = 0, the bank members will never voluntarily provide more than
the learning cost, c to the bank manager.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 3: In the absence of bank liquidity requirements, direct investors will not
buy the underwriting contract o↵ered by the bank manager.
Proof. See Appendix.
8Notice that the underwriting contract may be purchased even by the bank members who have
refused to provide funds directly to the bank.
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Bank Financing with Regulatory liquidity requirement
From above, it is clear that the bank manager will have, at t = 0, in his availability,
funds more than c, only if it is imposed exogenously by a regulatory authority.
Regulator: Consider now a regulator whose objective is to maximize the net social
surplus. The regulator can take the following actions: First, he can learn the state
of nature by incurring the learning cost c at t = 0. This cost is covered by the bank
members. The regulator incurs the cost, c and therefore, she observes the state
of nature at t=1. As a consequence, at t=1, the regulator perfectly agrees with
the bank manager regarding whether to invest in the project or not. In e↵ect, the
regulator’s beta is 19. Second, he can impose liquidity requirements, K, per member
on the intermediary (as described below). The regulator, however, does not have
the managerial skill to run a bank.
Regulatory liquidity requirements: The regulator (government) requires that
in order to form a coalition, investors have to provide an additional amount K, on
top of the total learning cost, 2c (learning cost is 2c since both the banker and the
regulator incur this cost). The bank reserves will be kept on the bank’s balance sheet
and the manager cannot use it for direct investment. Liquidity requirements have
been put in place by the government to bu↵er the bank against unexpected losses
and allow the manager to carry out o↵-balance sheet activities, such as underwriting.
At t = 2 bank members get their funds back in full, as long as no losses have been
incurred on o↵-balance sheet activities.
9This is a simplifying assumption and the results are robust even if regulator learning is not perfect.
The results hold as long as the regulator’s   is greater than  ⇤. It is natural to assume that the
regulator’s   is greater than the   of the bank members, since the regulator incurs the learning
cost and learns the state of nature, where as the bank members do not.
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If  R >  ⇤, the ex-ante expected payo↵ is similar to that in equation (2.4), with
the only di↵erence being that instead of c we have 2c (the additional c is the learning
cost of the regulator),
↵

 ⇤ +  
2
H +
✓
1   
⇤ +  
2
◆
L  I
 
  2c
N
(2.8)
Let us consider the case where  R <  ⇤. Suppose that the manager observes the
high state. The coalition members do not su ciently trust the manager and do
not provide the investment funds, I. The manager o↵ers the underwriting contract
to market investors. With regulatory reserves in place, the manager’s promise is
credible, since he has access to the bank reserves and if the bad state occurs, he can
resort to these reserves to make the promised payments. Thus, direct investors buy
some underwriting. The coalition members take this into account at t = 0 when
they provide the learning cost (t = 0) and the regulatory reserves to form the bank.
The condition for bank formation becomes stricter as investors explicitly take into
account the ex-ante (perceived) losses that they incur if underwriting contracts are
sold (of course, ex-post the underwriting contract is in fact profitable for coalition
members as well).
If  R <  ⇤, the coalition members do not provide the investment funds and the
manager extends an underwriting contract using the regulatory reserves, K, as a
bu↵er.
From Lemma 1, the underwriting contract specifies that the buyer receives H
regardless of the state realized. Hence, the manager needs to have access to funds
worth (H   L), so she can reassure the buyer that if the low outcome realizes the
buyer will be compensated according to the terms of the underwriting contract.
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Each bank member provides an additional amount K (on top of his share of the
learning costs). Thus, if K   H   L, the bank manager has enough funds available
to credibly sell the maximum number of underwriting contracts, Y, (which equals
the maximum scale of the project and the bank size). If K < H   L, the bank
manager can at most sell KH L underwriting contracts per bank member or
K
H LY
underwriting contracts in total (which is less than the maximum scale of the project).
With probability
⇣
 + ⇤
2
⌘
, the bank members agree with the manager and expect the
high state to occur. There are no payouts to the buyers of the underwriting contract
if the high state occurs. Of course, the bank earns the fee from the underwriting
contract, (H   I) (from Lemma 2). However, according to the perceptions of the
bank members, with probability
⇣
1   + ⇤2
⌘
, there is a loss of (H   L) per unit of
underwriting contract sold. Combining with the fee (which is paid irrespectively of
the state), the net payo↵ is (L   I). Therefore, the (perceived) expected payo↵ to
each bank member in this case is given by,
↵

min
✓
K
H   L, 1
◆✓
  +  ⇤
2
◆
(H   I) +
✓
1    +  
⇤
2
◆
(L  I)
  
  2c
N
(2.9)
From the definition of  ⇤, this perceived payo↵ is negative. Combining equations
(2.8) and (2.9), we obtain the perceived expected payo↵ for each member at t = 0.
VB = ↵

 ⇤ +  
2
H +
✓
1   
⇤ +  
2
◆
L  I
 
+
↵

min
✓
K
H   L, 1
◆✓
  +  ⇤
2
◆
(H   I) +
✓
1    +  
⇤
2
◆
(L  I)
  
  2c
N
(2.10)
Because the expression in equation (2.9) is negative, the higher the regulatory liq-
uidity requirements, K, the lower the perceived expected payo↵ to bank members.
So, the necessary condition for bank formation (VB   0) becomes tighter. This
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condition gives us an upper bound on K consistent with bank formation:
VB   0) K   
↵
h
 ⇤+ 
2 H +
⇣
1   ⇤+ 2
⌘
L  I
i
  2cN
↵
H L
h⇣
 + ⇤
2
⌘
(H   I) +
⇣
1   + ⇤2
⌘
(L  I)
i ⌘ K (2.11)
Since the regulator also observes the state of nature, he always agrees with the bank
manager. As a result, in order to achieve his objective, the regulator chooses the
reserve requirement K so as to maximize the amount of investment in the positive
NPV projects, given that the necessary condition for bank formation is satisfied.
Investors may still want to join the bank at t = 0 because the expected payo↵
of investing in the project through the bank is positive. The proposition below
summarizes these results:
Proposition 2: If K   H   L, then the regulator imposes K   (H   L). If
K < H   L, the regulatory reserves are set at K = K.
Notice that if K > H L, the manager only uses (H L). The remaining amount
(K   H + L) is not used. Hence, if the condition for bank formation (VB   0) is
satisfied for K   H   L, an imposition of a higher K does not make this condition
tighter.
Recall that in the absence of bank liquidity requirements, the bank members do
not provide any funds beyond cN to the bank. If at t = 1, the bank manager observes
the high state but  R <  ⇤ the coalition members do not provide the investment
funds, I. The bank manager cannot sell underwriting contracts because market
investors do not perceive her promise as credible. Therefore, a positive NPV project
is not financed. With bank liquidity requirements, the bank manager sells some
underwriting contracts (since market investors are reassured by the bank reserves)
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and the buyers of these contracts invest in the project. More specifically,
Proposition 3: If K   H   L, the bank manager sells Y underwriting contracts
and the investment in the project is Y I (its maximum scale). If K < H   L, the
bank manager sells KH LY underwriting contracts and the investment in the project
is KH LY I (less than its maximum scale).
Proof. See Appendix.
Intuitively, the bank reserves allow the bank manager (through the underwriting
contracts) to credibly promise the market investors the high outcome, regardless
of the realization of the state. Thus, market financing occurs even though in the
absence of banks it would not be possible (since VD < 0). By reducing the cost of
learning (per capita) from c to 2cY , the bank converts a negative NPV project into a
positive NPV one. However, the disagreement between the bank manager and bank
members does not allow the bank to invest directly in the project. The bank reserves
imposed by the regulator allows the bank manager to sell underwriting contracts
which incentivize market investors to invest in a project that was previously denied
credit from both the market and the bank. That is,
Corollary: The combination of economies of scale in learning, regulatory bank re-
serves and underwriting contracts allows the bank manager to trigger direct financing
in a project that would not otherwise be funded.
The key to our model is the assumption that individuals undervalue information
when it is filtered through actions of others, i.e.   < 1. The underwriting contract
is a costless exercise for the manager who observes the outcome is high while it is
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valuable to the market investor; trade is mutually beneficial due to this di↵erence in
perceptions.
Further, the underwriting contract can only be credibly extended if there are
liquidity requirements in place. A benevolent regulator is aware that liquidity re-
quirements are overall welfare improving. Thus, liquidity requirements (imposed by
a regulator) endogenously arise in this model. To reiterate a point made earlier,
the regulatory reserve requirement is not without a cost - it makes the condition for
bank formation stricter.
We should also point out that although banks can trigger direct financing, the op-
posite is not true in the model. The number of projects funded directly and the profit
investors make on these projects have no e↵ect on the bank-formation constraint
(equation 2.4). This constraint is only a↵ected by the degree of (dis)agreement
among the agents in the economy,  , which is project-specific and the ex-ante prob-
ability of the high state, ↵. Thus, the profit the agents make by directly investing
in projects cannot trigger bank formation.
We can derive an interesting and potentially testable empirical predictions by
comparative statics with respect to the expected  .
Lemma 4: Consider the case in which, K < H   L. An upward shift in the
distribution of   (keeping the di↵erence between the two bounds constant), leads to
a higher K.
Proof. See Appendix.
That is, the lower the uncertainty about the project’s prospects, the higher the
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bank liquidity requirements consistent with bank formation.
2.4 Discussion
2.4.1 Credit Default Swaps
Here we show that the insurance provided by the bank reserves cannot be obtained
through other means (cannot be created endogenously and has to be imposed). Con-
sider, for example, the case that there are no regulatory reserves in the bank’s balance
sheet and that the bank buys insurance through Credit Default Swaps (CDS).
The CDS issuer optimally incurs the learning cost, c, and so he agrees with the
bank manager regarding the outcome of the project. However, the direct investor
who buys the underwriting contract from the bank, agrees with the bank manager
and the CDS issuer with a probability  R <  ⇤. So, the investor will be convinced to
buy the underwriting contract only if the CDS issuer has set aside the funds required
for fulfilling his promise. But, in raising these funds, the CDS issuer faces exactly
the same problems as the bank manager. The perceived payo↵ of the fund providers
is given by equation (2.9), which is clearly negative. As a result, they do not supply
the required funds to the CDS issuer and the CDS contract is not credible to the
buyers of the underwriting contract. Hence the reserves required to credibly sell the
underwriting contract must be imposed by regulation.
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2.4.2 Noisy Learning
Thus far, we have considered the case that the signal is perfect and if one incurs the
learning cost, s/he perfectly foresees the future state of nature. As a consequence,
the bank never pays out on the underwriting contract and the bank reserves are
never used. Suppose now, that the signal is noisy: in the high state, payo↵ is
H with probability p and L with probability (1   p). In this case, the banker is
wrong with probability (1  p) and the bank reserves are used to pay the buyers of
the underwriting contracts with the same probability. The implication is that the
condition for bank formation becomes stricter. However, qualitatively, our results
remain unchanged.
2.5 Conclusion
We analyze a simple model of a financial system in which all agents are rational but
they discount information when it is filtered through actions of others. In our model
banks emerge endogenously and positively a↵ect direct investment. This interaction
is facilitated by the use of underwriting and regulatory bank reserves. Bank reserves
are used as a bu↵er stock to reassure direct investors that the underwriting contract
will be fulfilled. This leads to an increase in direct financing - more positive NPV
projects are undertaken. However, the bank reserves are not provided by bank
members voluntarily and have to be imposed by regulation. In the absence of bank
liquidity requirements, underwriting would be infeasible as the bank manager could
not have made credible promises regarding payments if the poor outcome occurred.
Thus, our model provides a new rationale for bank liquidity regulation. The novelty
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is that our justification is based on the asset side of the bank’s balance sheet as
opposed to the liability side in the existing literature. Further, our model predicts
that a decrease in the degree of uncertainty about the prospects of projects, an
upward shift in  , leads to a higher level of bank liquidity requirements consistent
with bank formation.
Finally, although in this paper we have considered a static model, our basic idea
can be embedded into a dynamic context to obtain a two-way relationship between
banks and direct financing (markets). In the dynamic setting, direct financing can
have a positive e↵ect on banks as the profits made by banks on the underwriting
contracts can be carried forward to relax their future funding constraint. Also,
additional concerns such as the banker’s reputation and the bank’s payout policy
will become important. We leave these issues for future research.
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2.6 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: The underwriting contract stipulates that the transfer (L0 L),
will be made in the event of poor outcome. The manager knows with certainty that
the high outcome will be realized and so there are no future payments related to the
underwriting contract. Therefore, to maximize Z, the manager will fully insure the
buyer against the poor outcome; i.e. L0 = H. Using L0 = H in equation (2.6), we
obtain Z = H   I.
Proof of Lemma 2: If at t = 0, any funds in excess of the learning cost, c is pro-
vided, at t = 1 a manager who has observed the high state, will use the excess funds
to invest in the project (either directly or through underwriting) even if  R <  ⇤.
But the bank members perceive this strategy as loss-making. Furthermore, they can
always provide the funds after the realization of  . That is, for bank members, any
funds in excess of c available to the bank manager imply a perceived cost (when
 R <  ⇤) without any compensating benefit. Therefore, at t = 0, they will not
voluntarily provide any funds more than c.
Proof of Lemma 3: By Lemma 2, the bank manager has no funds available
after incurring the learning cost, c. Market investors believe that the bad state
may occur with probability (1    R) and in that event the bank manager will not
be able to fulfil his promise. As a result for  R <  ⇤, their perceived payo↵ is
 RH + (1   R)L  I   Z < 0 for any Z   0 as  RH + (1   R)L  I < 0.
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Proof of Proposition 3: In equilibrium, Y agents coalesce to form the bank
(N = Y ). By Proposition 2, if K   H   L, the regulator imposes K   H   L.
Hence, in this case, the bank manager can credibly promise to fulfill Y underwriting
contracts (H   L is the amount that the bank has to pay the buyer of the under-
writing contract when the bad state realizes) and so, the project is undertaken at its
maximum scale. If K < H   L, the regulator sets K = K (by Proposition 3). As a
result, the bank manager can credibly promise to fulfil at most KH LY underwriting
contracts which implies that the investment in the project is KH LY I.
Proof of Lemma 4: The maximum K per bank member consistent with bank for-
mation is given in equation (2.11). An increase in   increases the numerator whereas
an increase in   makes the denominator less negative (the expected perceived loss
decreases). As a result, K increases.
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Chapter 3
Credit Market E ciency and the
Net Interest Margin
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3.1 Introduction
Consider a situation in which a firm (the borrower) has the choice between direct
(bond) and indirect (bank) financing. In this paper, the goal is to examine the
impact of the firm’s external financing choice on the overall e ciency in the credit
allocation (lending) process. I propose that a single measure, the bank net interest
margin, captures the degree of e ciency in the overall lending environment, in a
setting in which borrower type is unobservable. Further, I relate the structure of the
banking sector to issues of e ciency.
Motivation: Bernanke (1983) notes that the cost of credit intermediation (which
could be the physical cost of screening or monitoring) in the banking sector reflects
the degree of e ciency in bank lending. A higher cost leads to a credit squeeze by
the banking sector which adversely a↵ects the real sector.
In empirical work, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, (1999, 2000) proxy bank lending
e ciency using net interest margins. In their words, the bank net interest margin
reflects the spread between the net returns to savings and the gross return for real
investment. The argument goes that a wider net interest margin indicates a higher
cost in transferring funds from savers to borrowers and hence (cost) ine ciency.
I develop a model in which net interest margins reflect not only cost e ciency in
bank lending but also informational e ciency in the overall credit allocation process.
In a sense, I relate the bank net interest margin to the net social welfare.
Summary of the Model: I consider a model in which an entrepreneur (she)
seeks external financing but cannot signal her type, which leads to ine ciency. The
entrepreneur may approach either a bank or the bond market to raise funds for the
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project.
In bond financing, the investor simply provides the requisite funds to undertake the
project. With bank financing, in addition to providing credit, the banker (he) also
provides monitoring services. This may be due to a free-rider problem in the bond
market which is only solved in a coalition. Alternatively, banks could have access
to proprietary information which the bond market investors do not (Bhattacharya
and Chiesa, 1995; Yosha, 1995). Finally, it could be because they do not possess the
monitoring technology or that monitoring is prohibitively costly for bond market
investors.
Any project, if not monitored, succeeds with probability, p, and fails with proba-
bility, (1  p). Monitoring a project increases the probability with which it succeeds
by  . However, monitoring is costly and the cost is incurred upfront (at date, 0).
Heterogeneity among the projects arises as follows:   di↵ers across projects and
some projects experience a higher increase in probability of success due to moni-
toring than others. It is e cient to monitor a project only if the net benefit from
monitoring is positive.1   represents the private information of the borrower. See
the Literature Review section for a detailed motivation of the assumptions regarding
the parameter,  .
In a competitive lending environment, the financiers compete for projects and earn
a zero expected profit while the borrowers keep the entire surplus. The projects for
which monitoring is most e cient, borrow from the bank as they keep the surplus
from monitoring. The projects for which monitoring is least e cient, borrow in the
bond market.
1The assumption is formally stated in A2, page 10.
46
Some intermediate type projects may find it profitable to pool with the higher
types to take advantage of better borrowing terms. It is privately profitable for these
projects to demand bank loans, even though monitoring is not e cient for them from
a social perspective. This occurs when the benefit from a lower repayment in bank
financing exceeds the expected loss from monitoring, for a project.
I show that the unregulated competitive equilibrium is always ine cient and is
characterized by some degree of over-monitoring. Furthermore, a smaller net interest
margin corresponds to the equilibrium moving towards the e cient outcome.
I show that if bank equity is more expensive than deposits, regulatory bank cap-
ital (up to a certain level) will increase the net social welfare. Expensive equity
imposes a cost on bank financing, which makes it less attractive. There is an opti-
mal level of bank capital which may be imposed to achieve the e cient outcome. If
a higher requirement is imposed, the equilibrium will be ine cient and characterized
by under-monitoring. Critically, the bank equity has to be imposed as banks will
not optimally hold any costly equity.
Finally, I consider a monopolistic banking sector. In contrast to above, I show
that the monopolistic equilibrium may in fact be e cient. It is also possible that
the banking sector is ine ciently small (characterized by under-monitoring by banks
as opposed to over-monitoring which is the case with a fully competitive banking
sector). However, as before, a smaller interest margin indicates a move towards the
more e cient outcome. The source of ine ciency in this case in monopoly pricing
and informational asymmetry does not play a role.
The contributions of the paper are as follows:
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1. If the banking sector is perfectly competitive, there is over-monitoring. At the
other end of the spectrum, if the banking sector is monopolistic, there may be
the socially optimal level of monitoring or too little monitoring.
2. I show that a single measure, the bank net interest margin, captures the degree
of e ciency in the overall credit allocation process. Specifically, a wider bank net
interest margin indicates greater social ine ciency, all else equal. Further, this
result holds irrespective of whether the banking sector is perfectly competitive
or monopolistic (although, the mechanisms are distinct).
3. I provide a rationale for imposing costly bank capital requirements when the
banking sector is competitive. Costly equity makes bank financing less attractive
and pushes the equilibrium towards the e cient outcome. There is an optimal
level of equity that is imposed by the regulator to achieve the e cient outcome.
3.2 Related Literature
De Meza and Webb (1987) consider a similar mechanism in the context of a com-
petitive banking sector. Their results critically rely on the specific assumptions
on the supply of funds to the banking sector (the supply of deposits). If the sup-
ply of deposits is not decreasing in the rate of return on deposits, they show that
banks over-invest. If, however, the supply of deposits is backward-bending, banks
under-invest in equilibrium. Theoretically, the key di↵erence in this paper is that
I explicitly model the deposit market which allows me to explore the net interest
margin.
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The present paper is related most closely to two separate strands of the literature:
i. the role of banks and ii. the choice between informed and arm’s length debt.
i. Role of banks
The key assumption in the model may be broken down into two separate compo-
nents as follows: bank monitoring is valuable (there exists a positive  ) and di↵erent
projects benefit to di↵erent degrees from bank financing (  di↵ers across projects).
Positive  . Fama (1985) notes that there must be something special about bank
loans that borrowers are prepared to bear the costs of reserve requirements that do
not appear in direct financing. He suggests that contracting costs for bank loans
may be lower than for market securities (like bonds). Further, bank loans may carry
a signalling e↵ect which improves creditworthiness and reduces information costs of
other contracts.
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) present a model in which banks endogenously
produce more information than the bond market to build reputation. More infor-
mation allows banks to make the liquidation decision more e ciently. By doing so,
they build reputation over time. Bond market investors do not have these reputation
building incentives as they are single period players.
Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984) and Allen (1990) emphasize the role of banks
as information producers for outside agents (such as depositors). Leland and Pyle
(1977), Diamond (1984) and Boyd and Prescott (1986) show that banks provide
more e↵ective and e cient monitoring services.
Empirically, James (1987) finds that bank loan announcements by firms are as-
sociated with positive market reactions, while announcements of market debt are
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associated with zero or negative market reactions. More recently, Altman, Gande
and Saunders (2010) and Gande and Saunders (2012) find similar results. Gande
and Saunders (2012) argue that in addition to resolution of information asymmetries
a borrowing firm benefits from a banking relationship when the bank sells its loans
in the secondary loan market.2 Banks add to firm value through loan sales in the
secondary market which alleviates the borrower’s financial constraints.
In sum, Boot (2000) notes that banks develop close relationships with borrowers
over time and this proximity facilitates monitoring and screening to overcome costs
associated with asymmetric information.
Heterogeneity in  . The feature in my model which drives the core results, is
that   di↵ers across projects. In a sense, I relax the standard assumption that all
projects benefit equally from bank monitoring. I do not explicitly model the source
of heterogeneity.
Empirically, Gande and Saunders (2012) find that smaller and financially dis-
tressed borrowers have a higher positive stock reaction when its loans are sold in
the secondary market by their bank. In terms of the model presented here, it may
be interpreted that these borrower have a higher   and benefit more from bank
financing.
I have assumed that the parameter,  , is unobservable; i.e., it is the private infor-
mation of the borrower. While there are observable proxies for financial constraints,
these proxies are noisy. I have assumed un-observability to simplify the analysis.
The core results go through as long as   is not perfectly observed.
2Although, I call it bank monitoring, I am silent on the specific channels through which bank adds
value to a borrower. The value-added from bank financing may come from access to the secondary
loan market; however, I do not explicitly model this feature.
50
ii. The choice between informed and arm’s length debt:
Besanko and Kanatas (1993) present a model in which bank lending and other
credit contracts co-exist. Like I have in the model here, in addition to providing
credit a bank adds value through monitoring; while direct financing only provides
credit. Since the bank cannot commit to a level of monitoring, firms are financed
with a mixture of bank loan and direct financing (bonds or equity).
Diamond (1991) looks at the role of the firm’s reputation in its choice of external
financing source. Firms with high credit ratings rely on their reputation to raise
funds in the bond market. While, firms with middle of the spectrum credit ratings
borrow from the bank which incurs costly information acquisition and gives the firm
a better deal than uninformed bond market investors. Extremely low rated firms
rely on bond market financing (junk bonds).
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) look at the reputational concerns of banks and
show that firms which are at a higher risk of facing temporary negative shocks choose
bank financing since they have better incentives to produce costly information and
make the right liquidation decision.
Rajan (1992) suggests that bank’s private information lets them hold up borrowers
in the refinancing stage and extract rents. A firm trades o↵ the usual benefits of
bank lending (such as resolution of information asymmetries) against the cost of
hold up which determines its choice of financing source.
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and Repullo and Suarez (2000) study how the firm’s
net worth relates to its choice between direct and indirect financing. Morellec, Valta
and Zhdanov (2013) and von Thadden (1994) examine how the choice of external
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financing source a↵ect firm’s investment behavior.
Boot and Thakor (1997a,b) provide a model of coexistence of banks and equity
markets. Song and Thakor (2010) show that evolution of the equity markets make
(expensive) regulatory capital cheaper for banks which allows them to extend credit
to riskier borrowers.
These papers generally do not address security design issues (neither do I). One
exception is Bolton and Freixas (1999) in which bank loans, bond financing and
equity financing co-exist in equilibrium.
3.3 Model
3.3.1 Set-up
I consider a one-period (t = 0, 1) economy in which all agents are risk-neutral. All
returns are consumed at the end of the period. The risk-free rate is normalized to
0, so there is no discounting. In the core model, there are four types of agents: the
borrower/entrepreneur, the bank, depositors and bond market investors.
The entrepreneur (she) has access to a project. She is penniless and seeks outside
financing for her project. The project requires an investment, I, which is normalized
to 1. The investment is undertaken at t = 0 and returns to the project are realized
at t = 1.
The entrepreneur may approach either a bank or the bond market to raise funds
for the project. The key di↵erence between the two types of financing is that while
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investors in the bond market only provide credit, a banker monitors the project in
addition to providing the credit. It is assumed that in either case, the full investment
capital, 1, is borrowed. Further, investment is verifiable in the court of law and
everyone who raises finance, invests.
A project returns X (success) or 0 (failure). If a project is not monitored (bond
financing), it succeeds with probability, p and fails with probability, (1  p).
I consider only positive NPV projects:
A1: pX   1 > 0
If, on the other hand, a project is monitored (bank financing), the probability
with which it succeeds increases by   (payo↵s in the di↵erent states are una↵ected);
the project succeeds with probability, (p+  ) and fails with probability, (1  p   ).
  di↵ers across projects and is the solitary source of heterogeneity among projects
within the model. There are some projects which are uniformly distributed in the
interval,  i 2 [0,  ¯].  ¯ satisfies the restriction, (p+  ¯)  1. The assumption of uniform
distribution is for algebraic simplicity and does not carry qualitative implications.
The increase in success probability of the project due to monitoring,  i, is private
information of the entrepreneur. All projects are ex-ante observationally equivalent
and there are no screening technologies to ascertain a project’s type.
Monitoring is costly. To monitor a project, a non-pecuniary cost, M , is incurred
by the bank at date 0. The NPV of monitoring a project of type i is  iX M . There
exists a project,  m, for which the NPV of monitoring is equal to 0.
A2:  mX  M = 0 for some  m 2 [0,  ¯)
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There is a cut-o↵  m such that monitoring is only e cient if monitoring increases
the success probability of the project by  m (or more) and it is ine cient to do so
otherwise.
The assumption states that there are some projects,  m <  i   ¯ for which the
bank adds a strictly positive value. If the monitoring cost, M , is high such that
 m    ¯, bank monitoring does not add a strictly positive value for any project. I do
not consider this case.
For now, it is assumed that the monitoring cost is observable and verifiable by all.
If this were not the case, monitoring can be made incentive compatible by requiring
the banker to invest some of his own wealth in the project (as in Holmstrom and
Tirole, 1997). I show this later (Section 3.7).
A3: Projects are scarce.
I consider a perfectly competitive credit environment where financiers (banks or
bond market investors) compete for the projects. Financiers earn zero profit in
expectation. The entrepreneur chooses the mode of financing to maximize her payo↵.
E↵ectively, all costs are internalized by the entrepreneur.
In a variant of the core model, I consider the case in which the banker behaves
monopolistically and extracts some rent. (Section 5)
3.3.2 Bond Financing
The entrepreneur may raise the investment capital, 1, in the bond market (think of
the bond market investors as a single party). The investor o↵ers a contract, (Rc, 0)
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to ensure that she breaks even. Rc is the required repayment if the project succeeds
and 0 if the project fails.3 In the downside, the entrepreneur is protected by limited
liability.
The bond market investor does not monitor the project and therefore, it succeeds
with probability, p. In a competitive credit market, an investor in the bond market
earns a zero profit in expectation,
pRc   1 = 0 (3.1)
From the zero profit condition, we obtain the required repayment in bond financing,
Rc:
Rc =
1
p
(3.2)
The borrower’s expected payo↵, denoted ⇡c, is the probability of success, p times
the net project payo↵ which is X minus the scheduled repayment Rc, i.e.,
⇡c = p(X  Rc) = pX   1 (3.3)
Given A1 (all projects are positive NPV), an entrepreneur’s expected payo↵ to bond
financing is always positive.
3The subscript c indicates Capital market.
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3.3.3 Bank Financing
Suppose that the average project seeking bank loan is of type,  b ( b will be deter-
mined in equilibrium).
Deposits
The banker raises the investment funds in the deposit market. Supply of deposit is
infinite and the depositor earns a zero profit. Each depositor deposits an amount, 1.
The zero profit condition of the depositor is given as follows (where RD is the
deposit rate):
(p+  b)RD   1 = 0 (3.4)
From the zero profit condition of the depositor, we derive the deposit rate,
RD =
1
p+  b
(3.5)
Loans
The bank o↵ers a contract, (RL, 0) to the borrower to ensure that it breaks even.
RL is the required repayment if the project succeeds and 0 if the project fails. In
the downside the entrepreneur is protected by limited liability.
The banker incurs the monitoring cost which is M . In a competitive financing
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environment, the banker earns a zero profit in expectation,
(p+  b)(RL  RD) M = 0 (3.6)
Substituting RD in the zero profit condition, we obtain the loan rate:
RL =
1 +M
p+  b
(3.7)
The borrower’s expected payo↵, at t = 1 is the probability of success, (p+  b) times
the net project payo↵ which is X minus the scheduled repayment RL. The net
payo↵, denoted ⇡i, is given as follows:
⇡i = (p+  i)(X  RL) (3.8)
Given that the borrower’s expected payo↵ in bond financing is always positive, in
equilibrium the same is true for bank financing. This is true because a project with
negative expected payo↵ in bank financing will simply raise funds in the bond market
instead.
3.3.4 Relative Cost of Debt
Bank debt is more expensive than bond financing if,
RL( b) Rc > 0)M >  b
p
(3.9)
If the monitoring cost is su ciently large, bank debt is more expensive (consistent
with previous literature, e.g., Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997).
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Additionally, bank financing adds (weakly) positive value,  iX, to the project.
Therefore, if equation (3.9) is not satisfied, there is no bond financing in equilibrium
and all projects are financed by the banking sector.
Equation (3.9) is a necessary but not su cient condition for bond financing.
3.3.5 The E cient Equilibrium
In this section, I define the e cient equilibrium. I show in the rest of the paper that
due to asymmetric information regarding borrower type, the competitive equilibrium
is never e cient in an unregulated economy, although the e cient outcome may arise
in the monopolistic banking sector.
I define the e cient equilibrium as the one in which there is no over or under
monitoring. In the e cient equilibrium all projects for which monitoring is e cient,
are monitored and projects for which monitoring is ine cient, are not monitored.
Specifically,
Definition: The e cient equilibrium is one in which any project with  i <  m
seeks financing in the bond market and any project with  i >  m seeks a bank loan.
The case of a project with  i =  m is inconsequential to e ciency considerations.
In Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994), more bank loans invariably leads to higher
social e ciency since banks acquire more information and liquidate projects more
e ciently. The di↵erence in this model is that while it is e cient for some projects
to go to banks, it is e cient for the other projects to go to the bond market.
There is another source of ine ciency in the model: in bank financing, the more
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profitable projects subsidize the less profitable projects (higher   projects subsidize
the lower   projects), as they accept a higher repayment schedule relative to the full
information case (where the contract is written on observable type). However, this
ine ciency is related to distribution of surplus and does not a↵ect the net social
surplus. I disregard it in further analysis.
3.3.6 Equilibrium
I assume that the borrowers and the financiers play the following two-stage game:
Stage 1: The banker and the bond market investors simultaneously o↵er a contract,
(Rj, 0) where j = c, L.
Stage 2: Given the o↵ers made by the financiers, the entrepreneurs apply for either
bank or bond financing.
Definition: We consider a pure-strategy sub-game perfect equilibria. An equi-
librium consists of a choice of the borrowing contract by the entrepreneur and the
choices of interest rates by the banks and bondholders, which satisfies the follow-
ing conditions: given equilibrium choices and beliefs of the other players, a. an
entrepreneur’s choice maximizes her expected payo↵s and b. the interest rates set
by the lenders (depositors lending to banks and banks and bondholders to the en-
trepreneurs) are the lowest that gives them non-negative expected profits in equi-
librium. Any deviation from equilibrium strategies by any player results in a lower
expected payo↵ for him/her compared to that obtained in equilibrium, given others’
beliefs.
59
Proposition 1: There exists a cuto↵,  i =  q, where,
 q = max

0,
1
2X

 ((2p+  ¯)X   (2M + 1))±
q
((2p+  ¯)X   (2M + 1))2 + 4X(2pM    ¯)
  
(3.10)
An entrepreneur will only seek bank loan if  i >  q and prefer bond financing if
 i <  q.4 She is indi↵erent if  i =  q.
Proof. Assume initial beliefs,  q. An entrepreneur seeks bank financing if  i >  q
and bond financing if  i <  q. She is indi↵erent if  i =  q.
The average project borrowing from the bank succeeds with a probability, (p +
 b( q)). Therefore, in Stage 1 of the game the bank sets the borrower’s repayment
(from equation (3.7)) as,
RL( q) =
(1 +M)
p+  b
where  b =
 q +  ¯
2
(3.11)
An entrepreneur, with a project of type,  i, is indi↵erent between the two sources of
financing if her expected payo↵s are identical in both cases, for the given beliefs:
pX   1 = (p+  i)[X  RL( q)] (3.12)
The LHS is the expected payo↵ for an entrepreneur who borrows in the bond market,
irrespective of her type. The RHS is the expected payo↵ for an entrepreneur who
borrows from the bank and the payo↵ is increasing in type,  i.
It must be true that the above equation only holds for the marginal project,
4If both roots of  q are positive, either one may be the equilibrium.
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 i =  q. From the above, we derive an expression for the cuto↵,  q (equation (3.10)).
Note that the equation is quadratic in  q. Restrictions onM are imposed to ensure
that a positive root exists. The details of the derivation are put in the Appendix.
By construction, equation (3.12) holds with equality for  i =  q. For any  i >  q,
the RHS is greater than the LHS; the entrepreneur strictly prefers bank loan to
bond financing. And finally, for any  i <  q, the LHS is greater than the RHS; the
entrepreneur strictly prefers bond financing to bank loan.
Therefore, there is no profitable deviation for any project from the above equilib-
rium and the initial beliefs,  q, are proved to be correct.
In an e cient equilibrium,  q and  m coincide. However, we see below that such
an equilibrium does not exist in an unregulated economy and that the equilibrium
will be characterized by some degree of ine ciency.
Proposition 2: The equilibrium is ine cient and is characterized by over-monitoring
by banks, i.e.,  q <  m.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction.
Substituting RL( q) and Rc in equation (3.12), the condition for indi↵erence is
rewritten as,
pX   1 = (p+  i)

X   2(1 +M)
2p+  q +  ¯
 
(3.13)
Suppose that  q =  m.
Consider the marginally e cient project,  i =  m. Substituting and rearranging
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equation (3.13),
( m    ¯)
2p+  m +  ¯
=  mX   2(p+  m)M
2p+  m +  ¯
(3.14)
Note that  mX =M (by Assumption A2). Substituting,
( m    ¯)
2p+  m +  ¯
=M   2(p+  m)M
2p+  m +  ¯
(3.15)
Note that LHS < 0, since  m <  ¯. However, RHS > 0 since
2(p+ )
2p+ m+ ¯
 1 for any
 m <  ¯.
Therefore, for  i =  m, equation (3.15) is violated. A project with  i =  m, strictly
prefers to borrow from the bank. But, this is a contradiction to the starting point,
 q =  m.
Similarly, it can be shown that  q ⇧  m. It follows that  q <  m.
The high  i ( i >  m) projects seek bank financing. The low  i ( i <  q) projects
seek bond financing.
The most interesting case is that of the intermediate project ( q <  i <  m):
It is socially wasteful to monitor these projects, i.e.,  iX   M < 0. However,
pooling with the higher types subsidizes the intermediate type projects. The subsidy
makes bank financing privately optimal for these projects, i.e.,  iX (RL( q) Rc)  
0; with equality for  i =  q.
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3.3.7 Net Interest Margin
In this section, I derive the net interest margin in bank lending and discuss some
key empirical implications.
Definition: The net interest margin is the di↵erence between the loan rate and the
deposit rate in bank financing.
In the competitive banking sector, the net interest margin (call it Nim) is given
as follows:
Nim( q) = RL( q) RD( q) = M
p+  b
where  b =
 q +  ¯
2
(3.16)
Proposition 3: Suppose that the banking sector is competitive. A wider net interest
margin may indicate a larger banking sector and greater informational e ciency .
Proof. The net interest margin increases as the cut-o↵,  q, falls (the banking sector
expands). From Proposition 2, we know that  q <  m. A fall in  q (expansion of
bank financing) is clearly a less e cient outcome.
Therefore, a wider net interest margin corresponds to a move away the informa-
tionally e cient outcome.
It is possible that a change in the net interest margin is driven by one of the other
parameters in the model. For example, a higher monitoring cost,M , leads to a wider
net interest margin and indicates cost ine ciency but does not have implications for
informational e ciency.
Traditionally, in empirical work, a change in the bank net interest margin has
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been interpreted as a consequence of costs in banking. In Proposition 3, I show that
it may indicate other forms of e ciency as well. Interestingly, this ine ciency may
be corrected fully, as is discussed in Section 4.
3.3.8 Incentive Compatible Monitoring
So far, it has been assumed that monitoring is observable and verifiable, hence con-
tractible. If it is not contractible, a banker monitors only if it is incentive compatible
for him to do so. So, the banker monitors only if,
(p+  b)(RL  RD) M = (p+  b) M
p+  b
 M   p M
p+  b
(3.17)
The banker receives the face value Mp+ b . If he monitors and incurs the cost, M , he
receives the face value with probability, (p+  b). If he does not monitor, he receives
the face value with probability p.
The above condition is always violated and it is never incentive compatible for
the banker to monitor the project.
In the present model, there are multiple ways of making monitoring incentive
compatible for the banker. One solution (borrowed from Holmstrom and Tirole,
1997) is to require the banker to invest some of his personal wealth in the bank.
Suppose that the banker invests (B  M). The incentive problem becomes,
(p+  b)
B
p+  b
 M   p B
p+  b
(3.18)
For B   M(p+ b) b , the banker monitors the project even if he cannot be contractually
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obligated to do so.
Therefore a banker must invest an amount, B  M = pM b , of his personal wealth
as deposits to credibly signal that he will perform his monitoring duties.
Alteratively, if the banker is wealth constrained, for example, he could be o↵ered
a high enough compensation which makes monitoring incentive compatible.
3.4 Policy Implications
Consider that there are two additional types of agents:
There is a benevolent regulator. The regulator aims to maximize social surplus
and is unconcerned with distributional e↵ects.
There are also some investors in the equity market. The equity and deposit
markets are segmented (Guiso, Haliasos and Jappelli, 2002, Guiso and Sodini, 2013).
The participants in the equity market require a higher return than the depositors
(due to higher outside options, for example)
3.4.1 Capital Requirements
In this section, I show that if bank equity is more expensive than deposits, it is
possible to achieve the e cient outcome using regulatory capital requirements.
A standard assumption in banking literature is that bank equity is more expensive
than deposits even after risk-adjustment. Examples include Allen, Carletti and Mar-
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quez (2011), Mehran and Thakor (2011). Allen, Carletti and Marquez (2014) present
a model in which equity holder earns a higher expected return than depositors as
they allow bankruptcy costs to be reduced. Diamond and Rajan (2000) posit that
bank capital is socially more expensive than deposits since equity impedes liquidity
creation.
Suppose that the cost of equity capital is k(E) > 0, with k(0) = 0 and k0(E) > 0.
For simplicity, I assume that following functional form for the cost:
k(E) =  E,   > 0 (3.19)
In order to fund the project, the bank will raise E 2 [0, 1], in the equity market;
the remaining, (1  E), is raised in the form of deposits. Suppose that the average
project that borrows from the bank is of type,  b. Including the cost of equity capital,
the bank’s zero profit condition of the bank becomes:
(p+  b)RL   1 M    E = 0 (3.20)
If the project succeeds, the borrower repays, RL, given by:
RL =
1 +M +  E
(p+  b)
(3.21)
Lemma 4: The bank will never voluntarily raise funds using expensive equity.
Proof. Since lending is competitive, financiers act as Bertrand competitors and con-
tracts are designed to maximize borrower’s expected profit, subject to participation
constraints.
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Therefore, the bank o↵ering the lowest repayment rate (subject to the bank mak-
ing a zero profit) will capture the entire business. The repayment on loan is mini-
mized by setting E = 0.
Intuitively, since equity is more expensive than deposits, an unregulated bank
funds itself entirely with deposits and the banker privately sets E = 0.
Suppose that the regulator imposes a capital requirement, E 2 (0, 1]. Given
Lemma 4, the capital requirement always binds for any E > 0 and the bank raises
E in the equity market to comply with regulation.
Lemma 5: A regulator may set a capital requirement, ER > 0 such that the equi-
librium is e cient ( q =  m). ER is given as follow:
ER =
(1 +M)( ¯    m)
2 (p+  m)
(3.22)
Proof. A project,  q, is indi↵erent between borrowing from the bond market or the
bank if,
 1 =  qX   (p+  q)

1 +M +  E
(p+  b)
 
(3.23)
By Assumption, A2,  mX = M . Further, if  q =  m,  b =
 m+ ¯
2 . Substituting in
Equation (3.23), the expression for ER is derived.
If E < ER, then  q <  m and there is scope to improve e ciency by imposing
a higher requirement. If E > ER, then  q >  m and there is ine ciency due to
under-monitoring.
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Intuitively, costly equity is analogous to a penalty or a tax on bank financing.
When a higher penalty is imposed (e.g. through capital requirements), bank financ-
ing becomes less attractive and  q increases. A benevolent regulator sets E = ER
such that  q =  m, which is the e cient outcome.
I show below that the higher e ciency achieved through expensive equity does
not necessarily correspond to a smaller net interest margin.
The net interest margin for any E, is given as follows:
Nim(E) = RL(E) RD(E) = (M +  E)
(p+  b(E))
where  b =
 q(E) +  ¯
2
(3.24)
Corollary 1: Although, the equilibrium is more e cient through the use of expen-
sive equity, the e↵ect on the net interest margin is ambiguous.
Proof.
dNim
dE
=
2 (2p+  q(E) +  ¯)  2 0q(E)(M +  E)
(2p+  q(E) +  ¯)2
(3.25)
dNim
dE > 0 only if   >
M 0q(E)
2p+ q(E)+ ¯  0q(E)E .
Equity has two separate e↵ects on the net interest margin. These can be decom-
posed as follows:
The first e↵ect is that the cost of equity is passed on to the borrower which has a
positive e↵ect on the net interest margin (it increases).
The second e↵ect is that higher equity leads to an increase in  q (more profitable
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loans for the bank) which has a negative e↵ect on the net interest margin.
The overall e↵ect depends on which e↵ect dominates. If the cost of equity is
high enough (  big enough), the first e↵ect dominates. Otherwise the second e↵ect
dominates.
3.4.2 Discussion
In this section, I provide simple policy prescriptions to counter the lending ine -
ciency which arises in the case of a competitive banking sector. I also point out the
limitations.
The way to deal with the ine ciency in bank lending is to a↵ect the cost of
borrowing from the bank. As the required repayment, RL, increases, the equilibrium
 q increases towards  m (higher e ciency). This can be achieved by multiple ways:
1. One way to increase RL, would be to set a minimum requirement on loan rate.
Specifically (in the model), set RL such that  q =  m.
However, there are practical di culties in implementing this policy. In the
model, I consider only observationally equivalent projects. When projects may
be di↵erentiated, the one-rate-fits-all approach will no longer be the case.
Further, rates imposed conditional on observable qualities of the project is also
not a solution to the implementation problem. A lot of the information which
a bank uses to evaluate a project is ’soft’ (see Rajan, 1992) and may not be
observed by external parties, including the regulator.
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2. The regulator can impose a capital requirement (or some other tax) on the
bank, as described in the previous section. In a competitive lending market, the
tax is passed on to the borrower in its entirety. Imposing capital requirements
on the bank, gets around the di culty discussed above and makes the policy
implementable.
This policy prescription is reminiscent of De Meza and Webb (1987) in which a
higher loan rate is used to achieve the socially e cient level of investment.
3.5 Monopolistic Bank
In this section, I consider a variant of the basic model: the banking sector is monop-
olistic. The banker extracts some strictly positive profit from lending. The investors
in the bond market behave competitively and the market deposits is competitive, as
in the previous section.
The problem here is set up di↵erently from the case of the competitive banking
sector. In the competitive banking sector, the loan rate is driven down to the point
that the bankers make zero profit, in expectation. If a banker sets a higher loan
rate, the bank will lose all business to its competitors. This threat does not exist
in the monopolistic banking sector. In the monopolistic banking sector, the banker
makes the choice of the loan rate to maximize the bank’s total expected profits.
An equilibrium consists of a choice of the borrowing contracts by the entrepreneurs
and choices of the interest rates by banks and bondholders, which satisfies the fol-
lowing conditions: given equilibrium choices and beliefs of other players, a. the
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banker sets a repayment rate, RL
0, to maximize his expected profits and b. the
depositors and marginal borrower (between bond and bank financing) make zero
expected profits.
The new loan rate, RL
0 if not equal to the competitive loan rate, RL( q), results
in a new cuto↵,  0q such that projects with  i    0q seek bank financing and projects
with  i <  0q seek bond financing. The deposit rate is competitively set at RD( 
0
q).
For RL
0 and  0q (both parameters are determined in equilibrium), the banker makes
an average (per unit loan) expected profit (call it k), given as follows:
k =  M +
 
p+
 0q +  ¯
2
!
(RL
0  RD( 0q)) (3.26)
The banker incurs the monitoring cost (at date 0). If the project succeeds (at date
1), the borrower retains the di↵erence between the loan repayment, RL
0, and the
deposit rate, RD( 0q).
The total profit that the banker makes is therefore,
 ¯Z
 0q
k d i = ( ¯    0q)
"
 M +
 
p+
 0q +  ¯
2
!
(RL
0  RD( 0q))
#
(3.27)
The banker chooses RL
0 that maximizes the total profit subject to the participation
of the marginal borrower, who is of type  i =  0q (if this is satisfied, then participation
for all borrowers with  i >  0q is automatically satisfied). The banker’s problem is
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given as follows:
Max
RL
0 ( ¯    0q)
"
 M +
 
p+
 0q +  ¯
2
!
(RL
0  RD( 0q))
#
s.t. pX   1  (p+  0q)(X  RL0)
(3.28)
The constraint is that a borrower of type,  i =  0q (weakly) prefers bank financing to
bond financing.
Proposition 4: Suppose that the banker behaves monopolistically. There exists a
cuto↵,  i =  0q, such that an entrepreneur will only seek bank loan if  i >  
0
q and
prefer bond financing if  i <  0q. She is indi↵erent if  i =  
0
q.
Proof. The argument is identical to the proof for Proposition 1.
To solve for  0q and RL
0, consider the monopolist banker’s problem, above. First
note that the constraint satisfies with equality. The marginal project of type  0q is
indi↵erent between bank and bond financing. To break the indi↵erence, I assume
that such a borrower seeks bank financing. Substitute the constraint in the objec-
tive function. Take the First Order Condition with respect to RL
0 to derive the
equilibrium values.
Proposition 5: Suppose that the banker behaves monopolistically. It is possible
that the equilibrium is e cient, i.e.,  0q =  m. It is also possible that there is under-
monitoring, i.e.,  0q >  m. There is never over-monitoring,  
0
q ⌅  m.
Proof. The marginal project borrowing from the bank is of type  0q. From the
marginal borrower’s participation constraint (equation (3.28), with equality), the
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required repayment on loan, RL
0, is derived:
RL
0 =
1 +  0qX
p+  0q
(3.29)
The deposit rate is set competitively and is given as follows:
RD( 
0
q) =
1⇣
p+
 0q+ ¯
2
⌘ (3.30)
The banker’s profit from lending to the marginal borrower, who is of type  0q, is:
 M +
"
(p+  0q)RL
0  
 
p+
 0q +  ¯
2
!
RD( 
0
q)
#
(3.31)
The banker incurs the monitoring cost for the project. The marginal borrower
succeeds with probability (p+  0q) and repays RL
0. Any depositor is repaid with the
average probability of the loan portfolio,
⇣
p+
 0q+ ¯
2
⌘
.
Substituting, the banker’s expected profit from lending to the marginal borrower
is:
 0qX  M (3.32)
Note that the expected profit from lending to the marginal borrower is 0, for  0q =  m.
For any  0q <  m, the banker makes a negative expected profit. Therefore, the banker
sets RL
0 such that  0q    m.
For a monopolistic banking sector, the net interest margin (call it Nim0) is given
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as follows:
Nim0( 0q) = RL
0  RD( 0q) =
1 +  0qX
p+  0q
  2
(2p+  0q +  ¯)
(3.33)
Proposition 5: Suppose that the banking sector is monopolistic and the equilibrium
is ine cient (i.e.  q >  m). A wider net interest margin may indicate a smaller
banking sector and greater informational ine ciency.
Proof. The banker chooses RL
0 to maximize his expected profits.
A lower RL
0 will lead to a smaller  0q (more bank lending). This in turn will result
in a higher deposit rate (since dRDd q < 0) and ultimately a smaller net interest margin.
It is shown in Proposition 4 that  0q    m when the banking sector is monopolistic.
Therefore a smaller  0q which is shown to correspond to a smaller net interest margin
is a move towards the e cient outcome (which  0q =  m).
Using the same arguments, it may be shown that a wider net interest margin
corresponds to a bigger  0q and a move away the informationally e cient outcome.
Note that the monitoring cost does not enter the Net interest margin if the banking
sector is monopolistic. Intuitively, a higher cost will be absorbed by the monopolistic
banker and not passed on to the borrowers. Therefore, the sole source of ine ciency
(if there is ine ciency) in this case is monopoly pricing by the banker.
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3.6 Conclusion
I have presented a model of external financing choice and lending e ciency. A
borrower seeks either monitored bank financing or un-monitored bond financing. I
show that the equilibrium with competitive a banking sector is always ine cient
and is characterized by some degree of over-monitoring. The net interest margin
falls with e ciency in lending, supporting the view that the bank interest margin
may indicate overall ine ciency in the credit allocation environment (as opposed to
simply cost ine ciency in bank lending). In terms of policy implications, imposing
a higher bank loan rate (for example, via costly capital requirements) will increase
the e ciency in credit allocation across the banking sector and the bond market.
Finally, I show that in contrast to the competitive equilibrium, if the banking
sector is monopolistic, the equilibrium may be either e cient or it may be ine cient
and characterized by some under-monitoring.
I have considered two separate cases: the competitive and the monopolistic bank-
ing sector. I have been silent on the welfare implications of a transition from one
regime to another. This is a potentially interesting direction for future research.
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3.7 Appendix
Derivation of  q (competitive banking sector):
The indi↵erence condition between bank and bond financing is written as,
pX   1 = (p+  q)[X  RL( q)]
Substituting RL( q),
pX   1 = (p+  q)

X   2(1 +M)
2p+  q +  ¯
 
The equation is quadratic in  q and is rearranged as,
 2qX +  q[(2p+  ¯)X   (2M + 1)]  (2pM    ¯) = 0 (3.34)
A real solution exists only if the determinant   0,
[(2p+  ¯)X   (2M + 1)]2 + 4X(2pM    ¯)   0
If a real solution exists,
 q =
1
2X

 ((2p+  ¯)X   (2M + 1))±
q
((2p+  ¯)X   (2M + 1))2 + 4X(2pM    ¯)
 
There are three separate cases to consider:
1. Both roots of  q are positive. In this case either root may be the equilibrium.
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2. One root is positive and the other root is negative. Then  q equals the positive
root.
3. Finally if both roots are negative, bank financing dominates bond financing
for all projects, irrespective of type. So, we set  q equals 0.
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Chapter 4
Is Bank Equity more expensive
than Deposits?
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4.1 Introduction
A standard assumption in banking literature is that bank equity is costlier than
deposits. The assumption drives many results but it lacks sound theoretical founda-
tions (Admati, et. al., 2011). Furthermore, there is strong empirical evidence that
cognitive abilities a↵ect investor decision regarding participation in equity markets.
Overwhelming majority of investors hold bank deposits but only higher IQ investors
own equity (references below). We propose a simple model which provides a joint
explanation for why the return on bank equity is higher than that on deposits (al-
though there is universal risk neutrality) and why deposits and equity are held by
di↵erent groups of individuals.
Standard models in Finance (e.g. CAPM) predict that investors should invest in
the market portfolio (which spans all asset classes, by definition). However, there is
considerable evidence that the market for deposits is significantly segmented from
equity markets (Guiso, Haliassos and Jappelli, 2001 and Guiso and Sodini, 2013).
Significant fractions of investors only hold information-insensitive assets such as
bank savings accounts and they refrain from participating in equity markets. While
participation costs provide some explanation for this phenomenon, the size of direct
participation costs (such as fees) do not satisfactorily explain the degree of non-
participation in equity markets. It is also unclear why participation costs will deter
the a✏uent from investing the equity markets.
We consider a model in which potential investors have di↵erent monitoring skills.
There are two types of investors: skilled and unskilled, and the type is public knowl-
edge. The skilled can monitor a project and increase its productivity, whereas the
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unskilled cannot. Banks emerge endogenously and the bank manager is always a
skilled investor. In a coalition, the skilled banker may divert a fraction of the re-
turns from the unskilled and this diversion cannot be detected by the unskilled.
If diversion is large enough, bank capital structure is relevant and the optimal
arrangement entails that the unskilled investors become depositors and the skilled,
equity-holders. An unskilled investor does not participate in an all-equity bank
because if they own a security of the same seniority as the skilled, the payo↵ (after
diversion) does not meet their outside option (so, they prefer to invest on their own
than have equity in a bank). To attract funds from the unskilled, the banker o↵ers
them a senior deposit contract and retains the residual claim for himself and the
other skilled investors.
Therefore, we have here a segmented deposit and equity markets. This arises
endogenously in our setting as the seniority of deposits (relative to the equity held
by the skilled investors) ensures that the unskilled investor’s participation constraint
is satisfied.
As a result of the market segmentation, bank equity is more expensive than de-
posits. The skilled investors (equity) have a higher outside option than the unskilled
(deposits). Further, since skill is scarce, the skilled investors retain the surplus when
they manage the funds of the unskilled. Thus, in this setting the higher return on
equity is not related to risk. Instead, it is a premium for skill which is scarce.
The skilled equity-holders face the following tradeo↵: on the one hand, there is
economies of scale in a coalition. On the other hand, equity-holders incur a cost to
prevent diversion by the banker. The trade-o↵ determines the size of bank’s equity
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capital. Further, the degree of diversion along with the productivity di↵erential
between skilled and unskilled (diversion constraint) determines the optimal leverage
ratio of the bank. Taken together, we have implications for the optimal bank size.
We provide some interesting and potentially testable empirical implications: First,
our model predicts that banks become larger and more levered as the legal environ-
ment becomes stronger. Secondly, banks become larger and more levered as the
deposit market becomes less competitive. Finally, banks become larger and better
capitalized (holding leverage constant) as the monitoring technology improves.
4.2 Literature
The present paper is related most closely to two separate strands of the literature:
i. Cognitive ability and stock market participation and ii. Corporate Finance of
Banks.
4.2.1 Cognitive ability and stock market participation:
There is an emerging strand of literature which suggests that participation in equity
markets correlates with investor cognitive abilities. More intelligent investors are
more likely to own stocks.
Grinblatt, Keloharju and Linnainmaa (2011) find that equity market participation
increases in IQ, controlling for wealth, income, age and other demographic and
occupational information. They find that lack of cognitive skills is so fundamental
as a driver of non-participation that it defers large amounts of wealth from entering
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the equity market. Further, they find that IQ plays an equally important role with
regards to participation in a sub-sample when only the a✏uent are considered.
Cole, Paulson and Shashtry (2014) find that an additional year of education (which
likely a↵ects cognitive abilities positively) leads to a 4 percentage points increase in
probability that an individual owns equities. They also find more direct evidence of
cognitive ability positively a↵ecting equity market participation by studying siblings,
who grew up with similar backgrounds. Van Rooji, Lusardi and Alessie (2011) find
that equity ownership increases sharply with financial literacy and education, in
general.
Christelis, Jappelli and Padula (2010) find that propensity to invest in equities is
strongly associated with cognitive abilities (measured by mathematical, verbal and
recall tests). Further, propensity to hold informationally insensitive assets such as
bank savings accounts is not a↵ected by cognitive abilities.
4.2.2 Corporate Finance of Banks:
A recent paper that is closely related to ours is Allen and Carletti (2013). As we
have here, the expected return on bank equity is greater that the expected return
on deposits, in a risk neutral setting. However, there are important di↵erences:
1. Allen and Carletti (2013) assume that the deposit and equity markets are
segmented; without market segmentation depositors could invest directly in
equity and the return di↵erential will no longer exist. We derive the market
segmentation as an endogenous result.
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2. An essential ingredient in Allen and Carletti (2013) is costly bankruptcy. Eq-
uity is more expensive than deposits as it adds value through reducing ine -
cient bankruptcy costs. We do not use costly bankruptcy for our results.
Hart and Moore (1995) analyze the role of long term debt in restricting the manager
from raising new funds to invest in negative NPV projects. Similar to our story, the
debt contract (which is a long-term contract) in Hart and Moore (1995) curbs how
much the manager may divert for private benefits (for example, empire building).
Although we are silent on maturity structure of debt (since we have a one-period
model), we have additional implications with regards to returns on di↵erent securi-
ties.
Diamond (1984) uses a diversification argument to justify the use of the debt/deposit
contract in the bank capital structure. As the number of depositors go to infinity,
stochastic returns across uncorrelated projects become deterministic and the banker
can o↵er risk-less payo↵s to depositors. The debt contract is optimal in this model
and there is no equity capital. Similar to the argument in Diamond (1984), the
coalition in our model benefits from economies of scale. In contrast to Diamond
(1984) in which the optimal contract is debt, here the bank optimally holds both
deposits and outside equity; capital structure is relevant.
Calomiris and Kahn (1991) derive conditions under which demandable debt (with
sequential service constraint) is optimal in banking. To restrict the banker from
absconding with the banks’ profits in the bad state, uninsured depositors monitor the
banker and pull out their deposits (run) when they fear absconding. The sequential
service constraint circumvents the free rider problem of small depositors in incurring
monitoring costs. Monitoring depositors are first in line to withdraw if they get a
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negative signal. A free riding depositor is later in the queue and hence has a lower
expected payo↵ upon withdrawal. A sequential service constraint thus preserves the
monitoring incentives of depositors. Like Diamond (1984), there is no equity capital
in this model.
Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001) provide a theory of bank capital structure where
they di↵erentiate between the demandable debt contract (sequential service con-
straint) and capital (standard debt or equity) by their renegotiability. The banker
may threaten to withhold his specific skills and extract some rent from capital. De-
mandable debt gets around the hold-up problem because if the banker attempts to
renegotiate the terms of the demandable debt contract, depositors run on the bank
and pull out their deposits; this disintermediates the banker and destroys his rents.
Thus, the renegotiable capital sacrifices liquidity creation (loan-making) to provide
stability in the poor state. Equity capital is expensive in this model from a social
perspective as the equity claim prevents liquidity creation. In our model, we look
at the cost of bank equity vis-a-vis bank deposits in the standard sense of required
returns on these securities.
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) study a model with e↵ort moral hazard in which
internal capital strengthens monitoring incentives and allows external funds to be
raised. They do not consider security design issues and in their model debt and
equity are identical.
In Morrison and White (2005) the sound investors (similar to our skilled investors)
form the bank’s equity capital and the unsound investors are depositors. We use
this idea of di↵erent types of agents (set apart by skill and hence, outside options).
However, their focus too is not optimal security design and in fact, they assume the
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debt contract and do not derive it endogenously. Indeed, it is easy to show that
the contract they refer to as the deposit contract in their model could equally be an
equity contract.
Allen, Carletti and Marquez (2011) show that improved monitoring incentives
(due to higher capital) attracts more deposits and hence surplus extraction. Mehran
and Thakor (2009) essentially reinforce the same point (capital improves monitoring
incentives). They have a direct channel that higher bank capital leads to a higher
survival probability of the bank (at an interim date) which increases the marginal
benefit of monitoring. Further, this e↵ect is magnified as the higher monitoring
increases the value of the relationship loan portfolio.
In our model, higher equity capital attracts more deposits by easing the diversion
constraint. The argument does not rely on improved monitoring incentives and
therefore highlights a separate channel of why higher capital may lead to more
deposits.
Our theory provides a link between bank capital structure and the strength of
the legal system. Diamond (2004) presents a model of optimal debt when contract
enforcement is ine↵ective and expensive. If the lender goes to the court, it imposes
a cost on the overall value of the firm. Thus, ex-ante a lender cannot commit to
go to the court even if he observes borrower misbehavior. A senior claim (such as
debt) solves this problem of lender passivity as the entire cost of going to the court
is borne by the borrower.
We also have implications for the optimal size of bank. Cerasi and Daltung (2000)
derive the optimal size of a bank by trading o↵ the costs and benefits of a larger (di-
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versified) loan portfolio. Diversification increases the banker’s incentive to monitor
the loans. However, monitoring more loans also entails overload costs (since there is
a limit to the number of loans the banker can monitor). In our model, the trade-o↵
for the optimal size comes from the liabilities side of the balance sheet as opposed
to the loan portfolio.
4.3 Model
4.3.1 Set-up
We consider a one-period economy in which all agents are risk-neutral. At t = 0 there
is investment in a project and at t = 1 returns are realized. All agents consume at
time,t = 1. Each agent has an initial endowment of 1 unit at t = 0. There are many
projects to be undertaken, and if undertaken, a project yields either X (success) or
0 (failure) per unit of investment at t = 1. If the project is monitored, it returns X
with probability ph and 0 with probability (1   ph). If not monitored, the success
probability is pl, where pl < ph. Monitoring the project requires exerting e↵ort
which implies a non-pecuniary cost, F , where F   0. We assume that monitoring is
e cient in the sense that the increase in the expected return exceeds the monitoring
cost:
A1: (ph   pl)X > F
We also assume that all projects have positive net present value (NPV) even in
the absence of monitoring:
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A2: plX   1 > 0
There are two types of agents: skilled and unskilled. The agent type is public
information. Only the skilled are able to monitor projects, while the unskilled in-
vestors lack the expertise to monitor. There are N agents in total with a proportion
  of them being skilled and the rest unskilled.
The outside option of each agent is determined by the expected return of investing
on his own. Because monitoring is e cient (Assumption 1), the outside option of
the skilled agents (phX   F   1) is greater than that of the unskilled (plX   1).
The key friction in our model is diversion. If a skilled agent manages the funds
(the manager) of unskilled, he may divert a fraction   of the realized output. The
diverted amount can not be verified in a court of law. Further, the manager cannot
credibly commit to not divert funds from the unskilled even if it is beneficial for him
to do so ex-ante. A skilled manager can divert from unskilled but not from other
skilled agents. Finally, an unskilled manager cannot divert.
The skilled agents are scarce relative to the unskilled:
A3:    pl  phpl
Hence, the skilled investors keep any surplus that they generate from managing
the funds of the unskilled. This assumption may be relaxed to the extent that the
skilled investors get a non-zero fraction of the surplus (incremental profitability due
to monitoring).
Because of the increase in expected return of a project due to monitoring exceeds
the monitoring cost, maximization of the net social surplus (e ciency) requires that
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all funds invested are managed by skilled agents.
In this setting agents decide whether they will invest on their own or coalesce with
other agents to invest jointly. One of the coalition members becomes the manager.
The coalition of agents is the bank and the manager the banker. The banker may
be a skilled or an unskilled agent. In order to make our results clearer, we assume
that the monitoring cost, F , equals 0.
4.3.2 Some General Results
Consider an unskilled agent who manages a bank with n members. The expected
return of the combined investment of n units is nplX. The unskilled manager can
credibly promise to each bank member a maximum of plX. A higher o↵er is not
credible as it violates the participation constraint of the manager or some of the
other bank members. A skilled agent has a higher outside option (phX   F > plX
from investing on his own) and so will never delegate investment to an unskilled
agent. An unskilled agent may be indi↵erent between investing on his own and
delegating to another unskilled agent. Hence,
Lemma 1: If the banker is an unskilled agent, no skilled agent will join the bank.
Corollary: Banks managed by an unskilled agent may only be formed by unskilled
agents.
Furthermore, because an unskilled manager cannot divert part of the realized
return, the other unskilled bank members will receive the promised repayment, X,
if the project succeeds regardless of the security issued by the banker. That is,
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Lemma 2: If the banker is an unskilled agent, the bank capital structure is irrelevant.
If, instead, the banker is a skilled agent, the expected return of the combined
investment of n units is nphX. The skilled manager can credibly promise a maximum
of phX to each bank member. Thus, a skilled agent is indi↵erent between investing
on his own and delegating to another skilled. A skilled manager can attract an
unskilled agent by o↵ering him plX+ ✏, where ✏ can be infinitesimally small. Hence,
Lemma 3: If the banker is a skilled agent, both skilled and unskilled agents may
join the bank.
4.3.3 Benchmark Case
In the absence of diversion, all unskilled agents would like to join a bank managed
by a skilled agent. However, because a skilled banker can divert part of the realized
return there is an upper bound to the number of unskilled agents who can receive the
promised repayment if they join a bank managed by a skilled banker. As we show
below, the extent of diversion will determine the type of security the banker issues
and the number of unskilled agents who join the bank per skilled bank member.
We begin by considering the case where the only skilled agent in the bank is the
banker and the security issued is equity. At t = 0, the skilled banker accepts outside
funds from Iu unskilled investors. The total funds available to the bank, including
the banker’s endowment, are (Iu+1). The expected return to the bank from investing
this amount is ph(Iu+1)X. The skilled banker diverts a fraction (1  ) of the realized
cash flow (non-verifiable). The fraction that remains is distributed among all the
bank members (including the banker), as they have a claim of the same seniority
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(equity claim). Given that the banker cannot credibly commit to not divert, the
expected payo↵ to each unskilled member is  phX.
If the expected payo↵ to the unskilled meets their outside option, plX, diversion
by the skilled is harmless and it does not matter in terms of expected payo↵s whether
the unskilled members in the coalition hold equity (as above) or some other claim,
like debt 1. So, the bank’s capital structure is not relevant in this context. We do
not consider this case in the rest of the paper. Formally, from now on we assume
that:
A3: Diversion is large enough such that   < plph .
If this is the case, the equity claim no longer meets the outside option of the
unskilled agent as  phX < plX. The unskilled investors do not participate in the
all-equity bank. From the perspective of the skilled investors this is not desirable as
attracting funds from the unskilled allows them to extract surplus. Further, from an
e ciency point of view, it is desirable that the maximum possible amount of funds
is invested through the skilled agents and therefore, this is an ine cient outcome
in terms of the net social surplus. The above discussion leads us to the following
Lemma:
Lemma 4: Suppose that the banker diverts a fraction, (1    ) of the cash flows,
where   < plph . Unskilled investor will not participate in the bank as equity holders
and prefer to invest individually.
1The security held by the banker cannot be senior to that issued to the unskilled bank members.
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4.3.4 Optimal Contracts
In this section we derive the optimal contract for each type of agents. The banker
maximizes his profit subject to two constraints: i) the participation constraint of the
unskilled investors, and ii) the constraint that the total verifiable cash flow (after
diversion) must be weakly greater than the total promised payments to the unskilled
bank members and the banker (the diversion constraint). The contract o↵ered to
the unskilled bank members specifies the repayment, Ru, if the project succeeds (and
possibly its seniority relative to the banker’s claim). The banker’s payo↵ is Rs. If
the project fails, all bank members receive zero. Formally, the banker solves the
following problem:
Max
Iu
ph(Iu + 1)X   phRuIu   F
subject to  ph(Iu + 1)X phRuIu + phRs
phRu = plX
First note that the banker’s profit function is strictly increasing in the number
of unskilled agents joining the bank, Iu. This is true because, by Assumption 2,
the banker retains the full incremental profitability (due to monitoring), (phX  
plX), of each unskilled investor’s funds and the promised repayment equals the
unskilled outside option. That is, the unskilled participation constraint is binding.
By substituting the unskilled participation constraint into the diversion constraint,
we get:
(plX    phX)Iu   phX   phRs (4.1)
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Given Assumption 4,   < plph , the LHS increases with the number of unskilled agents
joining the bank, Iu. Hence, in order to maximize Iu consistent with the diversion
constraint being satisfied we set Rs = 0. Also, because the banker’s profit increases
in Iu, the diversion constraint will always be binding. This allows us to determine the
number of unskilled agents joining the bank, which is Iu =
 ph
pl  ph = d. Henceforth,
we refer to the amount of funds provided by the unskilled in the bank as d.
The optimal arrangement entails that the unskilled investors have priority over
the verifiable fraction of the cash-flow and so they receive the most senior claim
which can be interpreted as debt (deposit). In fact, it is risky debt with face value
Ru =
plX
ph
. This credibly ensures that the unskilled investors in the bank earn their
outside option (as opposed to the all-equity bank). The banker becomes the bank
equity holder (residual claimant).
If a skilled investor joins another, the benefit is cost sharing (as in Diamond, 1984)
since the monitoring cost is fixed for any scale of the project. However, in our model,
this e↵ect is interesting from a security design perspective. In Diamond (1984), the
optimal contract is the debt contract. Here, we show that the optimal contract for
the skilled investor is the equity contract.
The following Lemma summarizes these results:
Lemma 4: The optimal contract for the unskilled is debt (deposit) and the skilled
banker holds the residual claim (equity).
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4.3.5 More than One Skilled Bank Member
Now, we consider the case in which other skilled agents may join the bank. Let us
denote the total number of skilled agents joining the bank (including the banker)
by k and the total number of unskilled agents by d. From the above discussion it is
clear that the real constraint for the banker in his attempt to maximize his profits is
the diversion constraint and there is a maximum amount of debt consistent with this
constraint being satisfied. Also, a skilled agent can monitor the banker regarding
diversion. Hence, the optimal contract for any skilled bank member cannot be as
senior as the one given to the unskilled agents because that would make the diversion
constraint more binding. Thus, the optimal contract to the skilled investor should be
junior to debt. This contract could be equity, preferred equity or even debt junior to
the debt given to the unskilled. For simplicity, from now on we refer to this contract
as equity. In this case, the banker solves the following problem:
Max
d,k
1
k
[ph(d+ k)X   phRud  F ]
subject to  ph(d+ k)X dphRu + kphRs
phRu = plX
As in the case of one skilled bank member, the banker’s profit function is strictly in-
creasing in the number of unskilled agents joining the bank, d. Also, by substituting
the unskilled participation constraint into the diversion constraint, we obtain:
(plX    phX)d    phXk   kphRs (4.2)
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Because, by Assumption 4, pl    ph > 0 and the banker profit increases in d, profit
maximization requires Rs = 0 and the diversion constraint being binding. That is,
at the optimum:
(plX    phX)d =  phXk
)
✓
d
k
◆⇤
=
 ph
pl    ph (4.3)
Equation (4.3) gives us the optimal leverage.
The intuition is straightforward. Given the level of equity capital in the bank and
the level of diversion, 1   , the banker can credibly promise to depositors only up
to the amount of output which can not be diverted,  phX. This, in turn, determines
the maximum amount of funds that the depositors are willing to provide to the bank.
We summarize the above discussion in the following proposition:
Proposition 1: Both skilled and unskilled investors participate in a bank:
1. There are d unskilled depositors and,
2. The bank’s equity capital is made of k skilled investors, one of whom manages
the bank.
Proposition 2: Bank equity is more expensive than deposits.
Proof. The overall return to the investments made by the bank is (d+ k)phX   F .
The banker incurs the monitoring cost and each unit invested yields a return, phX.
The depositors are the unskilled investors and they earn their outside option, plX.
The equity claim is held by the skilled investors. Since skill is scarce, the skilled
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investors keep the entire surplus. Including the monitoring cost, the net payo↵ to
the skilled investor is phX +
d
k (ph   pl)X   Fk > plX.
As long as skill is scarce, the expected return on equity is strictly greater than
the expected return on deposits. Thus, in this risk-neutral setting the higher return
on equity is not related to risk. Instead, it is a premium for skill which is scarce.
Therefore, both the assumptions of diversion and skill scarcity are required for the
result that equity is more expensive than deposits.
The banker’s profit function is increasing in k, as a higher level of equity is bene-
ficial from a cost sharing perspective. Therefore, all skilled agents coalesce to form
a single bank and,
k⇤ =  N (4.4)
Lemma 5: There is a unique Nash equilibrium in which there is a single bank in
which size of equity is unbounded with, k⇤ =  N , where  N is the number of skilled
investors in the world.
4.3.6 Extension
In the extension we exogenously introduce a cost for skilled investors in the coalition;
the peer-monitoring cost. With the inclusion of the peer-monitoring cost, most of
the above results still hold, except that the size of bank equity is bounded.
The banker may divert from a skilled bank member, unless the skilled bank mem-
ber monitors the banker at a positive cost. We assume that this cost is increasing
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in the size of the coalition. As the bank’s balance sheet expands, the skilled bank
member needs to incur a higher peer-monitoring cost to prevent diversion.
Further, note that the leverage ratio is fixed, as the diversion constraint binds.
Using the optimal leverage ratio, the size of the bank is,
d+ k =
 ph
pl    phk + k (4.5)
The size is captured in terms of the exogenously given parameters, ( , ph and pl)
and k, which is determined within the model. Therefore the peer monitoring cost
which is a function of the bank size can be written as a function of bank equity only.
For simplicity, we consider a linear cost function and denote the peer monitoring
cost as  k per skilled member in the bank.
The banker maximization problem is rewritten to include the peer-monitoring
cost:
Max
d,k
1
k
[ph(d+ k)X   phdRu   F ]  k 
subject to
d
k
=
⇢
d
k
 ⇤
=
 ph
pl    ph
phRu = plX
While a higher level of equity is still beneficial from a cost sharing perspective, it
also imposes a higher peer-monitoring cost; the optimal level of equity is determined
at the margin. Substituting the constraints into the profit function and taking the
first order condition with respect to k, we derive the optimal size of bank equity, k⇤:
k⇤ =
s
F
 
(4.6)
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Lemma 6: There is a unique Nash equilibrium in which there are  Nk⇤ banks and
each bank has equity, k⇤ =
q
F
  , where  N is the number of skilled investors in the
world.
Proof. First consider the case that k⇤ = 2. We show that there is a unique Nash
equilibrium in which there are  N2 banks each with k = 2. Suppose that we start with
 N banks with k = 1. Then any banker will profitably deviate by coalescing with any
other and form a bank which is twice as big the original banks and this is a strictly
profitable strategy for the skilled investors (the unskilled investors are una↵ected).
Similarly, if we start with 1 bank with N skilled members, they profitably deviate
to break up into smaller banks till eventually there are  N2 banks each with k = 2.
Now, we consider the case that k⇤   3. There is a unique Nash equilibrium in
which there are  Nk banks each with k = k
⇤. We need to rule out the possibility
that there is a coordination failure problem. Suppose that we start with  N banks
with k = 1; each skilled investor manages his own bank. Consider then, a banker
deviates by coalescing with another and forming a bank twice as big as the original
banks. Is this a profitable deviation? The benefit to coalescing is B = F   Fk and
the cost is C = k . Coalition of skilled investors is possible if and only if benefits to
doing so exceeds the cost, B > C. (Due to the concavity of B and the linearity of
C in k) If B > C for a certain size k⇤, it must be true that B > C for any k < k⇤.
Thus, there is no coordination failure problem and bank equity, k⇤ is achieved as a
unique Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 7: There is a unique optimal size of the bank which is bounded. It is given
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as follow:
(d+ k)⇤ =
 ph
q
F
 
pl    ph +
s
F
 
(4.7)
Proof. The expression for the optimal size of the bank is readily obtained by com-
bining the results in Proposition 2 and Lemma 6.
Intuitively speaking, the sound investors who are the equity-holders in the bank
trade o↵ the costs and benefits of being in the bank. The optimal k⇤ determines the
participation of unskilled depositors, d⇤ in the bank via the optimal leverage ratio
given in Proposition 2 (which comes from the diversion constraint).
4.4 Robustness
4.4.1 Bargaining Power
Till now we have considered the case that skilled have all the bargaining power and
keep the full surplus from coalescing with the unskilled (since skill is scarce, A3). To
relax the assumption, denote the bargaining power of the skilled by   2 [0, 1]. The
skilled keep a fraction   of the surplus generated using the funds of the unskilled.
Suppose that there are d skilled and k unskilled investors in the bank. Consider
the case F = 0.
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The surplus generated from investing 1 unit of unskilled funds by the skilled is
(ph   pl)X. A depositor extracts a fraction (1    ) of the surplus. A depositor
receives a payo↵:
plX + [(1   )(ph   pl)X] (4.8)
Similarly, it may be worked out that the skilled investor has a payo↵,
phX + [ 
d
k
(ph   pl)X] (4.9)
For any   > 0, the return on equity is higher than the return on deposits. For   = 0,
both equity and deposits have the same payo↵, phX.
Under no circumstances, equity has a lower payo↵ than deposits. If that were the
case, the skilled investors will choose to become depositors (instead of being equity
holders) until the payo↵s to deposit and equity are at least equal.
The diversion constraint becomes:
 ph(d+ k)X = d[plX + (1   )(ph   pl)X]
) d
k
=
 ph
(1   )ph    (ph   pl) (4.10)
4.4.2 Deposit Insurance
Suppose that the regulator operates a deposit insurance scheme such that dr(k)
depositors are fully insured in the high state.
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To fund the scheme the regulator taxes the bank equity holders. The maximum
tax that may be levied by the regulator is the verifiable portion of the bank’s cash
flow after diversion, which is given by  (dr + k)phX. The tax is distributed among
the dr depositors and each depositor receives  (dr + k)phX/dr. This amount should
meet the outside option of the unskilled investors to ensure their participation in
the bank. That is,
1
dr
 (dr + k)phX = plX
) dr
k
=
 ph
pl    ph (4.11)
Therefore if the regulator operates a balanced budget deposit insurance scheme, the
outcome is identical to the case with no deposit insurance.
The same arguments hold for partially insured deposits.
The mechanism analyzed above only insures the depositors in the high state. Full
insurance, regardless of state will require the regulator to tax the bank at the time
of formation (date 0) and store the amount till the next date. This is socially sub-
optimal as investment in a project (whether monitored or not) is more e cient than
simply storing the funds (by Assumption).
To summarize,
Proposition 4: There exists no balanced-budget (accurately priced) deposit insur-
ance scheme which will ease the diversion constraint relative to the unregulated case.
104
4.5 Implications
4.5.1 Policy
Myers and Majluf (1984) show that equity issuance will be more expensive than debt
for current owners of the firm in a market characterized by asymmetric information
(the lemon’s problem). Admati et al (2011) conjecture that this cost only applies if
equity issuance is by a discretionary decision of the bank. If, instead, a higher capital
requirement is imposed by the regulator, new equity issued will not be subject to
the adverse selection cost.
However, in our model if capital requirement binds (i.e. if capital requirement is
higher than the privately optimal level), the outcome is socially costly. Given that
skilled investor manages the bank and unskilled investor deposits, higher leverage
means more productive use of funds. If a policy restricts leverage (higher capital
requirement), this is welfare reducing.
4.5.2 Predictions
We can derive some interesting and potentially testable predictions:
1. Bank becomes larger and more levered as diversion decreases (higher  ) (From
Equations (4.3) and (4.7)).
Intuitively, as diversion decreases, lower levels of equity needs to be in place to
convince the unskilled investors to accept the deposit contract. Further, given
that size of equity is determined by equation ., the lower leverage leads to a
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smaller bank.
One interpretation is that the parameter   captures the quality of the legal
system. The prediction is that as the legal system becomes stronger (contract
enforcement improves), banks become larger and more levered.
2. Bank becomes larger and more levered as skilled have higher bargaining power
(higher  ). (From Equation (4.10))
As the bargaining power of the skilled investor increases (the market for deposit
becomes less competitive) the skilled are required to pledge a lower payo↵ to
the depositors. This eases the diversion constraint and allows the bank to lever
up more.
Combining the above predictions we have that,
3. Bank Leverage and Size are correlated in the cross-section.
Gropp and Heider (2010) provide empirical support for this prediction.
4. Bank becomes larger and better capitalized as the monitoring cost, F , falls.
The leverage ratio is una↵ected. (From Equations (4.6) and (4.7))
As cost of monitoring, F , falls, the optimal size of equity increases, without
a↵ecting the leverage ratio (so bank size increases).
We may think of a decrease in F as an improvement in the bank’s monitoring
technology. As the monitoring technology improves, banks become larger due
to a higher level of equity capital in the bank while holding the leverage ratio
constant.
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The existing literature (e.g. Holmtrom and Tirole, 1997) suggest that higher
levels of equity will lead to better monitoring incentives. We propose that the
direction of causality may go in the opposite direction as well.
4.6 Conclusion
We present a model of bank capital structure in which the investors’ outside option
determines their choice of security in the bank. The skilled agents may divert from
the unskilled in a banking coalition. If diversion is large enough, the optimal arrange-
ment entails the following: the skilled investors hold equity capital and the unskilled
investors are the depositors (markets for equity and deposits are segmented). Due
to their higher outside option, the skilled command a skill premium and equity is
therefore more expensive than deposit.
The bank’s leverage ratio is determined by the diversion constraint. Further, the
level of equity is determined by the trade-o↵ faced by the skilled agents - economies
of scale (benefit) versus monitoring against diversion (cost). These two results are
combined to derive the optimal levels of debt and equity from which we get the
optimal size of bank.
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